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DETERIORATION PROCESS AND DECK FAILURE MECHANISM 
OF FLORIDA’S PRECAST DECK PANEL BRIDGES 
 
 
Ivan Gualtero 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
  During the late 70’s and early 80’s, several  precast deck panel bridges 
were constructed in Florida.  These utilize prestressed precast panels as stay-in-place 
forms and are designed to act compositely with a cast-in-place deck which is  poured 
subsequently.  Such bridges offer advantages of quicker construction and lower costs.  
However, several such bridges built in Florida developed extensive cracking and spalling.  
Following localized failures, the Florida Department of Transportation have decided to 
replace all 127 precast panel deck bridges in Districts 1 and 7.  Since deck replacement is 
contingent on funding, it is necessary to develop a rational procedure to decide the order 
in which they are replaced. This requires a better undertanding of the deterioration 
process and failure mechanism in such bridge decks. The methodology used in this study 
was to first analyze in detail 5 cases of sudden localized deck failures to identify the 
causes of the failures and any common factors in the failed bridges. Also  forensic studies 
were conducted on eight bridges scheduled for deck replacements during 2003 and 2004.   
In these studies it was possible to investigate in detail the condition of the deck at 
different stages of deterioration. Based on the information collected, a deck failure model 
was developed.
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CHAPTER 1.    INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Precast Deck Panel System 
 
 Precast deck panel systems started as an option to reduce bridge construction cost 
and time by eliminating most of the field formwork needed, and reducing the amount of 
cast-in-place concrete to be placed in the deck. This system is basically a precast 
prestressed concrete panel that spans between bridge girders serving as a support for the 
cast-in-place topping. When the topping concrete sets, it acts compositely with the panel 
in resisting subsequent dead and live load. 
 
 This deck construction system was first introduced in the early fifties in the 
Illinois highway system. In the years following, its use was limited due to questions and 
uncertainties about its performance, typically generated because of the innovative nature 
of this construction system. In the seventies, Departments of Transportation in several 
states such as Florida, Texas and Pennsylvania conducted extensive research to find 
answers to these questions [14]. 
 
 Following encouraging and positive results from different researches at that time, 
the panel deck construction system was finally accepted and incorporated into the 
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) 
specification [1]. This, as well as its inherent economy led to wide spread use of this deck 
construction system in highways including some major interstate networks which were 
built at the time. 
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1.2 Deck Panel System Construction Details 
 
 As mentioned earlier, this deck construction method consists of a precast 
prestressed concrete panel that spans between the girders of the bridge (see Fig. 1.1). 
Cast-in-Place Concrete
Precast PanelPanel Bearing
Girder
A
Girder
A
Figure 1.1. Typical Cross Section View 
 
 For this construction system, alternate construction details are available; basically 
different panel details and different types of panel bearing. In the early stages of the 
introduction of this construction method, there were no standard construction details, so 
different states used different details. 
 
1.2.1 Types of Precast Panels  
 
 There are two different types of panels: panel with ribs and panel without ribs 
(flat panel surface). The panels without ribs were used mainly in the initial years of 
introduction of this system. It was then found that a flat panel surface could lead to bond 
problems between the cast-in-place concrete and the panel. With the introduction of ribs 
in the panel, the bond between the panel and the topping concrete, was substantially 
improved. 
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Traffic direction
Precast Deck Panel
Cast in place
 Concrete
Prestressing Strands
 
Figure 1.2. Precast Deck Panel. Section A-A Fig. 1.1 
 
 Another construction detail that changed in precast panels was the length of the 
prestressing strand – whether it extended or stopped at the end of the panel. The 
extension is typically 3 inches. The idea of extending the strands came in an effort to 
obtain better control on shrinkage cracks and to improve the composite action between 
the vertical face of the panel and the topping concrete over the bridge girder. Different 
studies on the strand extensions have shown different results regarding the benefit of 
doing this [15]. This may be the reason why this construction detail was not used on 
Florida’s bridges. 
 
1.2.2 Types of Panel Bearings 
 
 Based on the structural behavior panel bearings may be classified as (1) positive 
panel bearing and (2) negative panel bearing.  
Negative Panel Bearing
Shear Connector
Soft Bearing Material
(Fiberboard)
Positive Panel Bearing
Panel Panel Panel Panel
 
Figure 1.3. Types of Panel Bearing 
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 As shown in Fig. 1.3, in the positive bearing case, the panel overhangs a strip of 
soft bearing material (fiberboard). The overhang is at least 1 ½ in. from the interior 
vertical face of the strip and the vertical face of the panel. Then the topping concrete is 
poured with special care over the girders to assure that concrete is placed under the 
precast panel. After the topping concrete is set, the panel is not longer supported by the 
fiberboard strip, but by the concrete underneath the panel. 
 
 In the case of negative bearing (Fig. 1.3.), the fiberboard strip has the same width 
as the part of the panel that is supported by the flange of the girder. In other words, there 
is no concrete under the support of panel after the topping concrete is placed. This is 
called negative bearing because after the topping concrete is set the panel is no longer 
supported by the fiberboard but by the topping concrete on top of the panel. This type of 
panel bearing makes deck construction easier. Originally it was thought to have no 
negative effects on the structural deck behavior, but recent studies have shown that this is 
not the case.         
 
1.3 Florida’s Deck Panel Bridges 
 
 Florida DOT has used has used different construction details for deck panel 
bridges throughout the years, including both positive and negative panel bearings.  
 
 In order to find the exact type of deck panel design used in each bridge, an 
extensive search was conducted at the FDOT District 1 and 7 maintenance office. In the 
search over a hundred bridge plans for deck panel systems were examined to obtain 
construction details. It was found that in almost all the bridges a full depth cast in place 
concrete deck instead of the deck panels was shown. Only in a few cases “as built” plans 
were found that showed deck panel construction details. This is shown in Figs. 1.4 - 1.5. 
 
 As shown in Fig. 1.4, the type of bearing used in these bridges is negative bearing 
with the soft bearing material covering the entire support surface of the panel. The 
recommended width of the bearing strip ranged from 1in. to 1 ½ in. and the thickness 
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varied from ½” minimum to 1 ½” maximum. The material used as bearing material was 
fiberboard (board composed of wood chips bonded together with resin). Also it is 
noticeable that there no strand extensions in the panels. 
 
   
 
 
Ø3/16@6"
3 4" Min.
1 12" Min.
Ø3/8"
 Prestressing Strands
6"6"
Ø2/8@6"
14 " Min
2 12"
1"
V
ar
ie
s 
(7"
 
to
 
8"
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4 Construction Details of Florida’s Precast Panel Decks 
 
Plan view Isometric of Shear Isometric of Shear Tie 
Bearing Material. 
Min. Width - 1” 
Max. Width – 1 ½” 
Min. Thickness ½” 
Max. Thickness 1 ½” 
Cast in Place Slab 
Precast Panel 
Turn Hooks in to C  Beam L 
Concrete Girder  Steel Girder  
Welded Shear 
Connectors 
A) SHEAR CONNECTOR DETAILS 
B) DECK CROSSECTION VIEW 
C) PANEL BEARING DETAILS 
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Regarding the panels, they usually have ribs. These ribs were 6 in. wide and 1 in. high 
and were spaced at 6 in. intervals. The panel thickness was usually 3 ½ in. (including 
ribs), the panel length 8 ft and the panel length (span) varied from 5 ft – 9 ft depending on 
the girder configuration.  The prestressing strands were typically located under the panel 
ribs leaving a minimum clearance of ¼ in from the bottom. The amount and the 
distribution of the prestressing strands depended on each deck design. (See Fig. 1.5) 
 
 
Figure 1.5 Precast Panel Prestressing Strands Configurations 
  
1.4 Use of Deck Panel Construction in Other States 
 
 In  a detail research about the use of deck panel construction in other states [5] it 
was found that Texas is only one state where this construction system is widely used. 
Almost 85 % of bridges in Texas use panel decks. Also these bridges have exhibited a 
performance comparable to full depth cast in place decks. Only longitudinal and 
transverse cracking have been observed on few occasions, but never sudden deck failures 
as in Florida. 
  
To
ta
l #
 
o
f s
tr
an
ds
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Texas DOT Deck Panel Design Specifications [16]. 
 
(1) Panels at end of spans must have #3 bars extending into CIP portion 
(2) Panels to be supported at least 1/4 in. above the girder so that mortar can flow 
 under the panels to provide positive bearing under live loads. 
(3) Polystyrene foam (Dow PL 300 Glue) used instead of fiberboard, available up to 
 4 in. thick. 
(4) Panel overhangs bearing is 1 ½ in. minimum. 
 
Texas does prohibit the use of panel decks for certain applications:   
 
(1) Curved steel girder bridges: Texas DOT’s Bridge Design Engineer prefers to 
 have a monolithic deck on these units because of the complicated interaction 
 between the deck, the curved girders, and the diaphragms.  
(2) Bridge widening: Panel decks are not allowed in the bay adjacent to the existing 
 structure because it is usually not possible to set the panels properly on the 
 existing structure. It can be used on the other girders when the widening involves 
 multiple girders.   
(3) Phased construction: Panel decks are not often allowed in the bay adjacent to the 
 previously placed deck because it is difficult to install a header form that leaves 
 enough room for the panels to be set properly on the girders from the earlier 
 stages.  
(4) Steel girders with narrow flanges: Girders with flanges less than 12 inches wide 
 make panel deck use difficult because the shear studs conflict with the panels. 
 Standard details allow shear studs to be skewed across the flange width to 
 facilitate the use of panels where sufficient flange width is available.    
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CHAPTER 2. DECK PANEL BRIDGE PERFORMANCE ON FDOT DISTRICTS 
1 & 7 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 
In Florida many precast deck panel bridges were built during the period from 1980 to 
1984, mostly in the Interstate Highway System, specifically in FDOT District 1  
and  7.  Of the 120 odd bridges, about 95% are located on the Interstate       (I-75). 
 
 In most of the bridges constructed in Florida, after 2 or 3 years of its construction, 
the deck started to exhibit unusual longitudinal cracking on the deck surface. As a result 
FDOT funded research to determine how this early cracking would affect service life of 
the bridge and its maintenance, and to identify methods that could reduce the 
deterioration [11]. From these studies the FDOT came up with a repair method to 
improve the structural behavior of the bridges and stop the deterioration. This method 
consists of removal of the fiberboard bearing and its replacement by non shrink epoxy. In 
theory this method works, but in practice deterioration has continued in most of the 
bridges. This it thought to be due to poor workmanship on the repairs and the high degree 
of difficulty required to place epoxy in the narrow space between the edge of the panel 
and the top of the girder (see Fig. 1.3).   
 
 In this chapter typical deficiencies found in deck panel bridges will  be described 
in detail. This information was collected from bridges in FDOT District 1 and 7. It was 
obtained from official FDOT bridge inspection reports. 
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 Some of the typical deficiencies described in his chapter have resulted in sudden 
localized deck failures. Such failures are described in detail in Chapter 3. 
 
 The typical structural deficiencies found in the precast deck panel bridges may be 
divided in two groups: 
 
1.    Deck underside (Precast panel) deficiencies: 
• Transverse Cracks 
• Corner cracks 
• Delaminations 
• Spalls 
 
2.    Deck top deficiencies: 
• Failed repairs of spalls 
• Spalls 
• Delaminations 
• Transverse and longitudinal cracks.. 
 
2.2 Deck Underside Deficiencies 
 
2.2.1 Bottom Transverse Cracks 
 
 This is a crack that appears in the bottom of the deck panels, transverse to the 
traffic direction. The average crack width is about 0.5 mm. It also has been found that 
this crack tends to run between two strands. This cracking can be found in the midspan, 
as well as close to the piers. Also it seems more likely to happen in steel girder bridges.  
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Figure 2.1 Bottom Transverse Crack 
 
2.2.2 Panel Corner Crack 
 
This crack is not as common as the transverse panel crack, the average crack width is 
about 1mm, this crack tends to be in a 45 degree angle and seldom is larger than 2 ft.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Panel Corner Crack 
 
Bridge Steel 
Girder 
Transverse Panel Crack 
Fiber Board Bearing 
Transverse Panel Joint 
Panel Transverse Joint 
Prestressed Concrete Girder 
Panel Corner Crack 
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2.2.3 Panel Spalls and Delaminations 
 
The occurrence of panel spall is not as common as other panel deficiencies. A panel spall 
can be found anywhere on the panel underside surface - there is no trend regarding its 
location. The regular spall size is 3 to 6 in.   In case of delaminations, they are located 
almost always near the panel supports (see Fig. 2.3). It has been found that delamination 
seems to occur more frequently in steel girder bridges, than concrete girder bridges.  The 
following picture was taken in I-75 over Alafia river (Bridge #100358 -59), one of the 
first bridges to exhibit problems in the deck in FDOT District 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Bottom Panel Spalls and Delaminations 
 
 
2.3 Deck Top Deficiencies 
 
2.3.1 Failed Repairs 
 
 Failed repairs are basically caused by the walking spall effect. This is when a 
deck spall is repaired (removing the adjacent concrete and placing epoxy or new 
concrete), and after a few days a new spall appears right next to the repair (see Fig 2.4) 
This new adjacent spalling also causes deterioration of the old repair. Depending on how 
Concrete Girder Fiberboard bearing replaced 
by epoxy 
Panel Underside  
Panel spall 
Panel 
Delamination 
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this deficiency is treated, it can lead to sudden deck failures. This is a very common 
deficiency in Florida’s precast deck panel bridges.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Failed Repair (Walking Spall) 
 
 
2.3.2 Deck Top Spalls 
 
 There are 2 different types of spalls that can be found in the deck surface. The 
first type is the spall that is related to the deck concrete quality and bridge age, this can 
occur anywhere on the deck, and since is not related with the type of construction it can 
be found in any concrete bridge deck. The second type of spall is directly related with the 
deck panel construction. See Fig. 2.5. The typical spall occurs between 2 longitudinal 
cracks, and under the wheel path. The spall sizes vary depending the age of the spall, and 
the trend is to keep growing in the longitudinal direction if not special repair is done. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Concrete Spall 
Repair 
Walking Spall 
Walking Spall 
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Figure 2.5. Deck Top Spall 
 
 
2.3.3 Deck Top Longitudinal and Transverse Cracking 
 
 Longitudinal cracks are very common in precast deck panels; this type of cracking 
is present in almost 90% of the deck panel bridges in FDOT Districts 1 and 7. It has been 
found that the longitudinal cracks are always located over the edges of the girders. 
Transverse cracks are not as common as longitudinal cracks. It has been observed that 
this type of crack is always located over the transverse panel joints. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6.  Deck Top Longitudinal and Transverse Cracks 
Deck Top 
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Traffic direction 
Longitudinal 
Crack 
Longitudinal Cracks 
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girder 
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CHAPTER 3.  LOCALIZED FAILURES 
 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
 Between 2000 and 2003, localized failures occurred in five panel bridges in 
Districts 1 and 7 (see Table 3.1. This chapter summarizes relevant information relating to 
these failures with the intent of identifying underlying trends, if any, for subsequent use 
in combination with information obtained in Chapter 5 to develop a rational deterioration 
and failure mechanism of these bridges. 
 
Table 3.1   Localized Deck Failures 
Bridge # District Failure Date Bridge Location 
170146 1 2/12/2000 Sarasota, I-75 NB Over Bee Ridge Rd 
170086 1 11/27/2000 Sarasota, I-75 NB Over Clark Rd 
170085 1  12/20/2000 Sarasota, I-75 SB Over Clark Rd 
100332 7 10/02/2002 Tampa, Crosstown Viaduct WB Span 38 
100332 7 9/05/2002 Tampa, Crosstown Viaduct WB Span 70 
 
 In the following sections descriptions and analyses of each localized failure are 
presented in the same order as their listing in Table 3.1 in Sections 3.2-3.6. A summary of 
the principal findings is included in Section 3.7.  
 
3.2   I-75 North Bound Over Bee Ridge Road, Bridge #170146 
 
 This 3-span bridge located in Sarasota, FL was built in 1981 and was 19 years old 
when it failed in February 2000. It has two 36 ft secondary spans (span 1, span 3) and  a 
118 ft 8 in. main span (span 2) to make the total bridge length 190 ft 8 in. The shorter 
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spans were built using two AASHTO Type IV girders on the outside and five AASHTO 
Type II girders on the inside all spaced 8 ft 10 in. apart. In the main span, fifteen 
AASHTO Type IV girders are spaced at 4 ft 4 1/4 in. or 4 ft 4 5/16 in. on centers as 
shown in Fig. 3.1. 
 
 The deck has a 7 in. thick concrete slab with the precast panel component being 
either 2-½ in. or 3-½ in. (at the rib-section) thick as shown in Fig. 3.2. This panel 
thickness is typical for all the deck panel bridges in this area. The specified compressive 
strength of concrete for the precast panel is 5,000 psi. It is 3,000 psi for the cast in place 
concrete slab. Additional information regarding deck panel construction may be found in 
Chapter 1. 
Varies
4'-414" 4'-4
1
4"4'-4
5
16" 4'-4
1
4"4'-4
5
16" 4'-4
5
16" 4'-4
5
16" 4'-4
5
16"4'-4
1
4" 4'-4
5
16"4'-4
1
4" 4'-4
1
4"
Varies
4'-4 516"4'-4
5
16"
12'12' 12'12'
6' 10'
Bay 1 Bay 2 Bay 3 Bay 4 Bay 8Bay 7Bay 6Bay 5 Bay 12Bay 11Bay 10Bay 9 Bay 14Bay 13
 
 
Figure 3.1   Cross Section View of Bridge #170146 – Main Span 
 
 The bridge has four 12 ft wide lanes, and 6 ft or 10 ft wide shoulders as shown in 
Fig. 3.1. There is an auxiliary lane that merges with traffic entering the interstate from 
Bee Ridge Road. The average daily traffic (ADT) in the bridge during the year 2000 was 
34,000 [27]. Thirty percent of the ADT was truck traffic (ADTT). Details are 
summarized in Table 3.2. 
 
18 in. x 24 in. 
Deck Failure  
*Girder AASHTO Type IV 
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Table 3.2   Bridge #170146 
Bridge #170146 Characteristics 
Year Built 1981 
Number of Spans 3 
Lanes on Structure 4 
ADT  * 34,000 
Percent Truck (ADTT) 30% 
Deck Condition Rating  (1999) 6 (Satisfactory) 
Composite Slab Thickness 7 in. 
Precast Panel Thickness 2-½ in (panel) 3-½ in (ribs) 
Girder Type AASHTO Type II and IV 
                              * National Bridge Inventory (1999) 
Ø3/16@6"
3 4" Min.
1 12" Min.
2 12"
Ø3/8"
 Prestressing Strands
6"6"
Ø2/8@6"
14 " Min
7" 1"
Traffic Direction
 
Figure 3.2    Composite Deck Section 
3.2.1 Failure Details 
 
 Localized failure occurred suddenly in the main span on the morning of Saturday, 
February 12, 2000. A hole formed in a panel that was estimated to be about “two feet 
square” [6]. A newspaper account made it 3 square ft - 18 in. x 24 in. [25]. However, no 
photographs of the damage are available.  
  
 Fig. 3.3 shows the location of the failed panel taken from reference [6]. It was re-
drawn to clarify the details. Failure occurred in “Span 2, Bay 10 at the edge of panel 13” 
[6]. This location is also identified in Fig.3.1 as coinciding with the placement of the right 
truck wheel in the slow lane (lane 1) close to the face of a girder.  
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 Ref. 6 also noted the following “On the deck surface numerous asphalt and 
concrete type spall repairs had been performed over the years extending south from the 
hole about six more feet. From that point extending approximately fifteen additional feet, 
M-1 type repairs have been made. This consisted of asphaltic type material about 18 in. 
wide…”  
 
3.2.1.1 Newspaper Account 
 
 In view of the limited information available, newspaper accounts of the failures 
were also reviewed. Two articles were printed in the local newspaper, Sarasota Herald 
Tribune [21, 25].  
 
The first article [25] was published on February 13, 2000 with the headline 
“Fallen asphalt closes lanes: a large pothole has developed again in the I-75 overpass at 
Bee Ridge.” The newspaper account stated “No one was injured from the falling debris, 
but this is the second time in three months that a large pothole has developed in the 
overpass”…. FDOT crews last had problems with the overpass after a motorist saw a 18 
in. hole in the south bound center lane in October”. No records of this 18 in. hole could 
be found.  
 
 A follow-up article [21] was published on February 15, 2000 with the headline 
“FDOT will have I-75 hole fixed soon”. The article stated that “Workers should be 
finished patching a hole in the northbound Interstate 75 overpass at Bee Ridge Road on 
Wednesday [February 16], according to the Florida Department of Transportation”.. 
FDOT spokesman Marsha Burke stated “It’s old and is going to require maintenance. It’s 
something that just happens with older bridges”  
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Figure 3.3   Location of Failed Panel, Bridge 170146 (I-75 NB) [6] 
 
 19 
3.2.2 Analysis 
 
 Analyses were carried out to identify the likely cause of failure. The starting point 
of the investigations was a review of inspection reports and environmental factors. 
Additionally, a simplified code-based [2] punching shear analysis was carried out to 
provide a measure of the magnitude of the failure load. These are briefly described in 
Sections 3.2.2.1-3.2.2.3. 
 
3.2.2.1 Inspection Reports 
 
  To help determine underlying trends, five consecutive inspection reports covering 
the period from 1992 to 1999 were reviewed. The final inspection in this sequence was 
carried out on November 24, 1999 less than 3 months before failure occurred on February 
12, 2000. Scanned excerpts from the relevant sections of the inspection report are 
included in Table 3.3. 
 
 The earliest report (May ’92) notes the presence of Class 1 (0-1/64th in.) 
longitudinal cracks along inside girders. The bottom had “occasional” transverse cracks 
with efflorescence that had not changed since Jan 1984. Mention is made of spalls in span 
3 adjacent to a previously patched area and span 2 (right travel lane where the failure 
occurred). This information is more or less repeated in the next two reports (Dec ’94 and 
Dec ’95). In the report prepared in Nov’ 97 dimensions of the spall in the right travel lane 
(6 ft 6 in. x 6 in.) are given. The inspector is also critical of the use of asphalt 
(“inappropriate material”) for repair since it is “respalling around the edges”.  
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Table 3.3    Excerpts from Inspection Reports (Bridge #170146)  
 FDOT Bridge Inspection Report (Deck) 
11
/2
4/
99
 
 
11
/0
5/
97
 
 
12
/1
3/
95
 
 
12
/1
3/
94
 
 
05
/0
4/
92
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 The final inspection report (Nov ’99)  classifies the deck rating as ‘6’ 
(satisfactory) with a condition state of 3 since the combined area of distress between 2% 
to 10% of total deck area. The longitudinal cracks described in all previous reports are 
mentioned though now there were “random minor transverse cracks with efflorescence”. 
Details of cracking in Bay 4 of Span 3 and transverse cracking in Bay 5 of Span 3 are 
mentioned.  
 
 Significantly, no reference is made as to the condition of the deck in Span 2, right 
lane (where failure actually occurred). This had been identified in the four previous 
reports from 1992-1997 shown underlined in Table 3.3.  
   
3.2.3 Environmental Conditions 
 
 It had been speculated that rainfall can be a contributory factor towards failure. 
Fig. 3.4 shows the distribution of rainfall for Sarasota in the period from Jan 12-Feb 12 
2000 [17].  In the week immediately preceding failure there was no rainfall. However, 
there was significant (over 1 in.) rainfall 2 weeks earlier on Jan 24.  
 
 For the record, on the day of the failure, the temperature varied from a minimum 
of 55°F to a maximum 80°F [17].   
 
3.2.4 Punching Shear 
 
 An estimate of the punching shear resistance can be obtained using code specified 
formula [2]. The analysis is approximate since available information is limited, e.g. the 
exact location of the punching failure in the deck is unknown. Only the panel where 
failure occurred was shown in the sketch (Fig. 3.3) included in the consultant’s 
emergency report [6].  
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Figure 3.4   Sarasota Precipitation  
 
 Two extreme cases are analyzed (1) full composite action and, (2) no composite 
action. For both cases, the wheel load (rectangular footprint, 10 in. x 20 in. [1]) is 
positioned at the critical section adjacent to the girder as shown in Fig. 3.1. Full 
composite action refers to the case where the wheel load is resisted by the entire 7 in. 
thick concrete slab (Fig. 3.2). This provides an upper bound on the maximum shear 
resistance. A lower bound on the shear resistance is provided when due to spalling and 
subsequent temporary repairs using flexible, asphalt-type material, the entire load is 
resisted by the precast, prestressed panel. In the analysis, the failure plane is assumed to 
be unaffected by the differing compressive strengths of the CIP (3000 psi) and precast 
prestressed panel (5000 psi). 
 
 Inspection reports indicated that cracking developed along both the longitudinal 
and transverse edges of the panel. The fiberboard bearing does not transfer loads to the 
girder and therefore, shear resistance was only provided by the two uncracked surfaces 
that extended half the effective depth away, 0.5de, from the wheel for the assumed 450 
failure surface. Calculation of the punching shear load for both cases is summarized in 
Table 3.4. Complete calculations are shown in Appendix A.  
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 In Table 3.4, b0 signifies the failure perimeter as defined in Ref. 2. For the non-
composite case, the minimum depth of the precast panel is used to calculate the effective 
depth. The calculation shows that the failure load varies from 15.3 kips to 56.3 kips. The 
former load is smaller than the AASHTO design wheel load without the impact factor. 
The dramatic reduction in punching shear resistance in the absence of contribution from 
the cast-in-place slab provides an explanation as to why failure occurred. 
 
Table 3.4    Punching Shear Resistance Bridge # 170146 
Load Case Punching Shear  
Resistance* 
Full Composite Action 
4" * 6.56"
6/8" Rebar
1.87"
* Average values
3/8" Strand
Vertical Crack
3" * Fiberboard 
Bearing
20"
Tire Contact area:         b=20in     l = 10 in
 
CIP 
de = 4 in. 
b0 = 34 in. 
VCIP= 29.8 kips 
PANEL 
de = 2.56 in. (ave) 
VPANEL = 26.5 kips 
 
VTOTAL = 56.3 kips 
 
No Composite Action  
(
rib
)
3.06"(
panel
)
2.06"
Contact areaSpal
Fiberboard 
bearing
(
rib
)
3.5"(
panel
)
2.0"
20" 7"
3/8" Strand
Tire Contact area:         bs=20in     ls = 10 in 
 
CIP 
VCIP= 0 kips 
 
PANEL 
de = 2.06 in. (min) 
b0 = 32.1 in. 
 
VPANEL = 15.3 kips 
VTOTAL = 15.3 kips 
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Table 3.4    (Continued) 
Effective Depth 
2.06"
2 12"
1"
Ø3/8"
 Prestressing Strands Ø2/8@6"
3.06"
14 " Min6" 6"
Ø3/16@6"
Trafic Direction
 
ASSUMPTIONS 
 
1) Failure plane unaffected by the presence of higher compressive strength of the precast deck. 
2) Fiberboard does not transfer loads. Shear resistance of cracked transverse and longitudinal 
panel boundaries are neglected 
* See Appendix A for detailed calculations. 
 
3.2.5 Conclusions 
 
 Inspection reports indicate that longitudinal reflective cracks formed along the 
girder lines but remained dormant for over 10 years (1984-1994). Subsequently, there 
was more transverse cracking, spalling, repair and failure of re-repair culminating in 
localized failure. The dormant period suggests that failure may have been due to 
cumulative shear fatigue. Also, loads in the slower right lane could also have been lower. 
However, no information on the distribution of truck traffic over lanes is available.  
 
 Simplified analysis indicated that regions of the deck where the cast-in-place slab 
did not resist any load could fail under design loads (Table 3.4). A review of the 
inspection records indicates that barring the final inspection, all four previous inspections 
had commented on the span where failure eventually occurred. Environmental factors 
may have played a role. Sustained rainfall could have led to bond degradation between 
concrete and reinforcement thereby lowering the shear capacity. Such effect would be 
limited to the cast-in-place slab.  
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3.3  I-75 NB Over Clark Rd Bridge #170086 
 
 This four span bridge also located in Sarasota was built in 1980 and was 20 years 
old at the time of failure. It has two 88 ft 3 in. spans (span 2, span 3) and two 32 ft 6 in. 
secondary spans (span 1, span 4) for a total bridge length of 241 ft 6 in. The shorter spans 
use two AASHTO Type IV girders on the outside and five AASHTO Type II girders on 
the inside. These girders were all spaced 8 ft 10 in. apart as shown in Fig. 3.5. The two 
longer spans use seven AASHTO Type IV girders also spaced 8 ft 10 in. apart. 
 
  The composite slab is 7 in. thick. No specific details are available. However, they 
are likely to be similar to that shown in Fig. 3.2. The specified compressive strength of 
concrete for the precast panel is 5,000 psi and is 3,000 psi for the cast in place concrete 
slab. More details regarding deck panel construction may be found in Chapter 1. 
 
 The bridge has three 12 ft lanes, and two 10 ft wide shoulders as shown in Fig. 
3.5. The average daily traffic (ADT) in the bridge during the year 2000 was 34,000 [27]. 
Thirty percent of the ADT was truck traffic. Details are summarized in Table 3.5. These 
are identical to that for the previous bridge.  
Table 3.5   Bridge #170086 
Bridge #170086 Characteristics 
Year Built 1980 
Number of Spans 4 
Lanes on Structure 3 
ADT [3.1] 34,000 
ADTT [3.1] 30% 
Deck Condition Rating (2000)  7 (Good) 
Composite Slab Thickness 7 in 
Precast Panel Thickness 2-½ in (panel) 3-½ in (ribs) 
Girder Type AASHTO Type II and IV 
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3.3.1 Failure Details 
 
 Localized punching shear occurred late morning, Monday November 27, 2000. 
According to the consultant’s emergency response report [7], failure occurred in span 4 
(secondary span), bay 6, on the right lane where a 60 in. by 36 in. gaping hole developed 
near end bent 5 (Fig. 3.6). The report stated “Half of the end panel adjacent to the 
expansion joint had been replaced at some previous time. This hole was the result of the 
failure of the remaining half of that panel”. 
 
 A photograph of the failed bridge panel obtained from the Sarasota Herald [4] is 
shown in Fig. 3.7. The entire concrete in the failed corner region was missing and debris 
can be seen lying on the road below. Some of the reinforcement had deformed plastically 
though none appear to be broken. However, the prestressing strands were ruptured. The 
location of the failed panel in span 4 is identified in the sketch provided in the 
consultant’s report. As before, it has been re-drawn for clarity. This location is also 
identified in Fig. 3.5 as coinciding with the placement of the right truck wheel in the slow 
lane (Lane 1) close to the face of a girder.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5    Cross Section View of Bridge #170086 
 
Bridge # 170186 Secondary Span
8'-10"8'-10"2'-9" 8'-10"
9'-1012"
2'-9"8'-10"8'-10"8'-10"
9'-1012"
12' 12' 12'
Panel Failure  
 
(Right Lane) 
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3.3.1.1 Newspaper Account 
 
 Two articles related to the failure were reported in the local newspaper, Sarasota 
Herald Tribune [4, 22].  
 
 The first article [4] published on November 28, 2000 with the headline “Hole 
opens up in bridge on I-75 at State Road 72”. It noted that the hole that opened up was 
within “a week after a state crew made repairs on the same spot”. The Florida Highway 
Patrol reported that there were “no injuries or vehicle damage…”. 
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Figure 3.6   Location of Failed Panel, Bridge 170086 [7] 
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 The second article published the following day [22] made the following 
observation “The DOT offers assurances of daily checks and close inspections every 45 
days, but those haven’t predicted these failures. More effort and funds are needed 
immediately to make these bridges safe as soon as possible – before lives are lost. If 
protecting public safety requires shifting priorities or obtaining emergency funding, so be 
it.”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7   View of Failed Panel Bridge #170086 (Courtesy Sarasota Herald) [4] 
 
3.3.2 Analysis 
3.3.2.1 Inspection Reports 
 Table 3.6 contains relevant scanned excerpts from the last five inspection reports 
over the period Jan ’93 to May ’00. The last report (May ’00) refers to the deck condition 
about six months prior to failure on Nov 27 ’00. 
 
 
Failed Panel 
Replaced 
panel segment 
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 The first three reports over the period Jan ’93 to Jun ’96 are quite similar. 
Longitudinal cracks formed first along the girder lines followed by occasional transverse 
cracks at panel joints. As for the previous bridge (Table 3.3), the inspectors found “no 
significant change” over the 11 year period from May ‘85 to Jun ’96.  
 
Table 3.6   Excerpts from Inspection Reports (Bridge #170086)  
 FDOT Bridge Inspection Report (Deck) 
05
/0
8/
00
 
 
05
/0
4/
98
 
 
06
/1
9/
96
 
 
08
/2
4/
94
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Table 3.6    (Continued) 
01
/0
4/
93
 
 
 
 However, significant deterioration was observed in the next inspection carried out 
in May ’98. Instead of “occasional” cracks reported earlier, longitudinal and transverse 
cracks had developed “throughout”. There was also severe cracking of repairs and spalls 
around the edge of the repair. The cracks were as wide as 1/8 in. (class 5). Mention is 
also made of deck repair over a large region about 26 ft x 4 ft at abutment 5. The 
description is not clear to tie it to eventual failure (see Fig. 3.7). 
 
 In the final report (May ’00), top deck cracking is described as “minor”. This 
suggests that deficiencies identified earlier had been repaired. A small spall (4 in. x 4 in. 
x 0.2 in.) is mentioned as occurring at the “center of the west lane, 3m (10 ft) from the 
abutment 5 joint”. The actual failure occurred at approximately the same location but in 
the east lane.  
 
3.3.3 Environmental Conditions 
  
 Fig. 3.8 shows the distribution of rainfall for Sarasota in the period from Oct 27- 
Nov 27 2000 [17].  In the week immediately preceding failure there was about 0.68 in. of 
rain. It rained on 24th and 25th just 2 days before failure occurred. In this instance, rainfall 
may have been a factor. For the record, on the day of the failure, the temperature varied 
from a minimum of 53°F to a maximum 72°F. 
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Figure 3.8   Sarasota Precipitation (Oct 27 – Nov 27 / 2000) 
 
3.3.4 Punching Shear 
 
 According to the consultant’s report cited earlier, “half of the end panel adjacent 
to the expansion joint had been replaced at some previous time. This hole was the result 
of the failure of the remaining half of that panel” [7]. The panel section that was replaced 
is marked in Fig. 3.7. 
 
  Assuming that no shear transfer was possible at the joint between the old and 
new panel, and reflective transverse cracking on the other side of the panel, the resistance 
of the slab is by one-way, not two-way shear. This “beam shear” type resistance is given 
by 2 dbf wc' . Table 3.6 shows an estimate of the shear resistance taking bw as 36 in. (the 
estimated unfailed length of a panel) with an average effective depth d of 2.56 in. Only 
the case where there is no composite action is considered since it gives lower loads. The 
calculated resistance is 13 kips smaller than the design load. The extent of the failed 
region is believed to be much greater in this failure because of the joint between the old 
and new panel (see Fig. 3.7, Table 3.7). 
Deck Failure 
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Table 3.7    Punching Shear Resistance Bridge # 170086  
Load Case Shear  
Resistance 
G
ird
er
 
To
p
G
ird
er
 
To
p Precast Panel
Precast PanelPrecast Panel
Precast Panel
Section of the panel
previously replaced
10"
1'-8"
End of the bridge
Wheel
Contact area
8'
Construction
Joint
Panel Joint
2'
3'
Plan View 
 
bw= 36in 
d = 2.56in (ave) 
f’c = 5000 psi 
 
VPANEL = 2√f’cbwd 
VPANEL =13 kips 
 
VTOTAL = 13 kips 
 
 3.3.5 Conclusions 
 
 A number of factors were responsible for this unusual failure. The most important 
of these was the joint between a panel segment – repaired and old - adjacent to an 
expansion joint (Fig. 3.7). In addition, there was heavy rainfall prior to failure that may 
have been a contributory factor by degrading the bond between concrete and steel. 
Unfortunately, there are too many unknowns to arrive at any definite conclusion. 
 
 The last inspection report six months prior to failure, mentions a spall close to the 
eventual failure location excepting that the west rather than the east lane was mentioned. 
It also noted damage to repaired areas in the form of cracking and spalling. The 
newspaper account stated that failure occurred at the same spot where temporary repairs 
had been carried out a week earlier. The shear failure load (Table 3.7) indicates that the 
deck could fail under design loads for this condition.  
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  3.4 I-75 SB Over Clark Rd Bridge #170085  
 
 This 4-span bridge is identical to the one described on Section 3.3 and was also 
constructed the same year. A cross-section view is given in Fig. 3.9 while Table 3.8 
provides a summary of relevant bridge details (this is identical to Table 3.5). 
 
3.4.1 Failure Details 
 
 Localized failure occurred early morning on Wednesday December 20, 2000. 
According to the emergency response report [8] failure occurred in the first panel, bay 2 
in span 3 adjacent to bent 3.  The hole that punched right through the panel was estimated 
to be about 18 in. x 18 in. Fig. 3.10 shows the location of the failed panel. This is taken 
from reference [8] but was re-drawn for clarity. No photos of the localized failure are 
available. 
 
 From the cross section view Fig. 3.9 it can be seen that failure again occurred in 
the right lane close to the panel support (girder face). 
 
Table 3.8   Bridge #170085 Details 
Bridge #170085 Characteristics 
Year Built 1980 
Number of Spans 4 
Lanes on Structure 3 
ADT (2000)* 34,000 
Percent Truck ADTT 30% 
Deck Condition Rating  (2000)* 7 (Good) 
Composite Slab Thickness 7 in 
Precast Panel Thickness 2-½ in (panel) 3-½ in (ribs) 
Girder Type AASHTO Type II and IV 
                                    * From National Bridge Inventory (2000) 
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Figure 3.9   Cross Section View of Bridge #170085 
 
3.4.1.1 Newspaper Account 
 
 Three articles regarding the failure were reported in the local newspaper, Sarasota 
Herald Tribune [23,24,26]. Of these only the first and last had relevant information. 
 
 The first article published on December 21, 2000 [26] stated that the hole was 
discovered at 7 am and that no one was injured. The reported size of the hole is 3 ft x 5 ft 
– same as in the previous bridge – possibly a mistake. The reporter quotes FDOT 
spokesman Gene O’Dell who said “We just had our consultant inspect the Clark Road 
bridge two weeks ago and they said it was fine”. The  last article published on December 
23, 2000 [23] stated that the damage had been repaired and the bridge was opened to 
traffic. Mention was also made that a consultant was inspecting the bridge decks every 45 
days and FDOT employees check them out once a month to “see if there are any bad 
cracks, anything that will create a hole” (O’Dell’s quote). 
 
18 in x 18 in  
Panel Failure  
(Right Lane) 
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Figure 3.10    Location of Failed Panel Bridge #170085 [8] 
 
3.4.2 Analysis 
 
3.4.2.1 Inspection Reports 
 
  The five inspections preceding the localized failure were carried out on the same 
dates as the previous bridge (Table 3.6) in Jan ’93, Aug ’94, Jun ’96, May ’98 and May 
’00. The last inspection was completed about 7 months prior to the localized failure that 
occurred on Dec 21 ’00. Scanned excerpts from the complete reports are summarized in 
Table 3.9.  
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 The first two reports over the period Jan ’93 to Aug ’94 are quite similar to that 
for the previous bridge. Longitudinal cracks occurred first with occasional transverse 
cracks at panel joints. The inspectors state that the cracks first noted in the report dated 
May 1985 “appear to show no change”. 
 
 The next inspection carried out in Jun ’96 reported more deterioration. All four 
spans contained longitudinal cracks along the beam lines with transverse cracking at the 
panel joint. Span 3 (where failure eventually occurred) had developed three spalls in the 
left lane ranging from 10 in. x 6 in. x 0.4 in. to 30 in. x 6 in. x 1 ¼ in. A fairly large 6 ft 6 
in. x 6 in. x 1 ¼ in. spall had also developed in the center lane. In addition, patched areas 
in the left lane had cracked. This was expected to spall in the future. 
 
 Aside from longitudinal and transverse cracking in all spans, the inspection 
carried out in May ’98 mentions that damage reported previously in span 3 had been 
repaired. However, cracks (up to 1/16 in.) and delamination had occurred in the repairs 
along the “west edge pavement stripe”. A delamination area 20 in. x 12 in. surrounding 
an asphalt patch at midspan in span 4 in the same region (west edge pavement stripe) had 
formed.  
 
 In the final report (May ’00), top decking cracking is described as “minor”. The 
delamination in the middle of span 4 reported in the previous report had not grown in 
size. Fig. 3.11, scanned from the photo addendum of this inspection report, shows 
“concrete and asphalt patches throughout spall  span 3  1m x 50mm with exposed steel”. 
The deficiency shown here happens to be at the exact location where failure occurred six 
months later. The deck condition rating of was given as 7, and the condition state of the 
bridge was reported as 2. None of the reports describe the underside of the deck. This 
suggests there was no cracking or efflorescence. 
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Figure 3.11   Deck Deficiency Six Months Before Failure, Bridge #170085 
 
Table 3.9   Excerpts from Inspection Reports (Bridge #170085)  
 FDOT Bridge Inspection Report (Deck) 
05
/0
8/
99
 
 
05
/0
4/
98
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Table 3.9   (Continued) 
 FDOT Bridge Inspection Report (Deck) 
06
/1
9/
96
 
 
08
/2
4/
94
 
 
01
/0
4/
93
 
 
 
 From the cross section view Fig. 3.9 we can see that the failure occurred again in 
the right lane and close to the panel support girder face. 
 
3.4.3 Environmental Conditions 
 
 Fig. 3.12 shows the distribution of rainfall for Sarasota in the period from Nov 20- 
Dec 20 2000 [17].  In the ten days immediately preceding failure it rained on six 
occasions. It rained 0.05 in. the day before failure occurred. In this instance, rainfall may 
have been a factor. For the record, on the day of the failure, the temperature varied from a 
minimum of 38°F to a maximum 58°F. 
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Figure. 3.12    Sarasota Precipitation (Nov 20 – Dec 20 / 2000) 
 
3.4.4 Punching Shear 
 
 As the geometry and the material properties in the deck were identical to that in 
the previous bridges, the calculated punching shear failure load is also identical. The 
lower bound for the failure load is calculated to be 15.3 kips which is smaller than the 
design wheel load. See Table 3.4 for details.  
 
3.4.5 Conclusions 
 
 The failure in this bridge was very similar to that in the first bridge (Section 3.2). 
Shear fatigue may have been responsible for failure. The failure load was estimated to be 
15.3 kips (Table 3.4). The last inspection report stated that repairs had started to crack.  
As all three bridges failed in the same region, faulty construction was undoubtedly a 
factor though precise faults cannot be pinpointed at this time. 
Deck Failure 
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3.5  CrossTown Viaduct over Downtown Tampa, Bridge #100332 Span 38 
 
 This 9,600 ft bridge is the longest deck panel bridge in the area. It has a total of 91 
spans, of which 24 were built in 1975 using a full-depth cast in place concrete slab. The 
remaining 67 spans were built in 1980 using precast deck panels. Two of 67 spans used 
steel girders (average span 170 ft) while the rest used prestress girders (average span 80 
ft). This was one of the first deck panel bridges built on a main highway in District 7. 
 
  Span 38, where the failure occurred, was built using prestressed concrete girders. 
Its span length was 47 ft. The bridge section was 22 year old at the time of the failure.  
 
 The composite slab was 7 in. thick with the precast panel thickness varying 
between 2-½ in. or 3-½ in. (at the rib-section) as shown in Fig. 3.2. This panel thickness 
is typical for all deck panel bridges in this area. The specified compressive strength of 
concrete used for the precast panel is 5,000 psi. It is 3,000 psi for the cast in place 
concrete slab. More details regarding deck panel construction may be found in Chapter 1. 
 
 The bridge has two 12 ft lanes. The right shoulder is 8 ft wide and the left 
shoulder is only 4 ft wide, as shown in Fig. 3.13. The average daily traffic (ADT) during 
2002 was 23,000 [27]. Eight percent of the ADT was truck traffic (Table 3.10).  
 
 
 
 42 
 
Figure 3.13    Cross Section View of Bridge# 100332, Span 38 
 
Table 3.10    Bridge #100332  Details 
Bridge #100332 Characteristics 
Year Built 1975 (spans 1 – 24) 1980 (spans 25 – 91) 
Number of spans 91 
Lanes on Structure 2 
ADT  (2002) [17] 23,000 
Percent Truck ADTT [17] 8% 
Deck Condition Rating Span 38 (2001) 5 (Fair) 
Deck Condition Rating Span 70 (2003) 5 (Fair) 
Composite Slab Thickness 7 in. 
Precast Panel Thickness 2-½ in (panel) 3-½ in (ribs) 
Girder Type (Span 38) AASHTO Type IV 
 
 
 
 
5 ft 3 in by 2ft 6 in 
Deck Failure  
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3.5.1 Failure Details 
 
 This failure was first noticed early morning on Wednesday, October 2 2002. It 
was located on the right lane close to mid-span. A gaping 5 ft 3 in. by 2 ft 6 in. hole 
formed (see Fig. 3.14). The same figure shows photos of the failed region and its 
underside two days prior to failure. Staining of the underside is visible. The concrete and 
repair material separated from the reinforcement which did not rupture. Fig. 3.15 
provides a sketch showing the failure location on the deck.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.14    Localized Deck Failure. Bridge #100332, Span 38 
 
 
2 Days Before Failure Deck Failure 
Top View 
Underside View 
2 Days Before Failure Deck Failure 
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 This damage was repaired by demolishing the whole bay where the failure 
occurred and placing a new deck using full depth cast in place concrete. 
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Figure 3.15    Location of Failed Panel, Bridge #100332 Span 38 
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3.5.1.1 Newspaper Account 
 
 No account of the failure was published in the local newspaper.  
 
3.5.2 Analysis 
  
3.5.2.1 Inspection Reports 
 
 The five inspections preceding the localized failure were carried out over eight 
years in May ’93, May ’95, Aug. ’97, Aug. ’99 and Aug. '01. The reports provide 
information on the entire bridge and for this reason there is minimal information relating 
to span 38 where the failure occurred. In the last biennual inspection completed in Aug 
'01 approximately 14 months before the failure occurred on October 2 2002, the deck was 
given a condition rating of 5 (Fair) and a condition state of 2. No significant deficiencies 
relating to span 38 were documented. Scanned excerpts from these inspection reports are 
summarized in Table 3.11 for completeness.  
 
 Because of widespread deterioration of the bridge it was continuously monitoring 
by FDOT. Information from these monthly inspections provide invaluable information on 
the progression of degradation leading to failure.  
 
 Deterioration of the section that eventually failed was first reported on July 31 
2002 as "30 in. x 20 in. concrete delamination". This was determined on the basis of a 
"hammer test" in which the suspected region is hit with a hammer and a hollow sound 
detected. By August 19 2002 the delamination had changed to a 48 in. by 10 ¾ in. spall. 
This spall was temporarily patched at that time. At the next inspection on September 30 
2002, the patch was found to have failed. In addition, the extent of the spall had increased 
to 48 in. by 30 in. by 1.5 in deep (See Fig. 3.14). Temporary repairs were again carried 
out and the patch repaired. Two days later, this new patch failed and a 48 in. by 30 in. 
gaping hole developed at the site as shown in Fig. 3.14.  
 46 
  A USF research team visited the bridge one day after failure. Measurements taken 
at the site and from retrieved debris indicated that the deck was thinner than its nominal 
thickness. It was found to be 6-3/8 in. not 7 in. as specified in the plans stamped "as 
built" (see Fig. 3.16). 
 
Table 3.11    Excerpts from Inspection Reports (Bridge #100332 Span 38)  
 FDOT Bridge Inspection Report (Deck) 
08
/2
9/
01
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Table 3.11    (Continued) 
 
FDOT Bridge Inspection Report (Deck) 
08
/3
1/
99
 
 
  
08
/2
6/
97
 
 
05
/1
5/
95
 
 
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Table 3.11    (Continued) 
 FDOT Bridge Inspection Report (Deck) 
05
/2
0/
93
 
                                                  
                                               
 
Figure 3.16    Deck Thickness Measurements and Details of Failed Section. 
                              Bridge #100332, Span 38 
 
3.5.3 Environmental Conditions 
   
 Precipitation readings at Tampa International Airport (6 miles from the bridge) 
for a period of one month before the localized deck failure are shown in Fig. 3.17. It may 
seen that that there was continuous rain over five days with a rainfall of 0.55 in. one week 
before the failure. However, no rain occurred 4 days before failure, For the record, on the 
day of the failure, the temperature varied from a minimum of 75°F to a maximum 88°F. 
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Figure. 3.17    Tampa International Airport (Sep 02 – Oct 02 2002) 
 
3.5.4 Punching Shear  
 
 Although the deck was found to be thinner than its nominal value (see Fig. 3.15), 
the panel thickness was the same. In view of this, the lowerbound value of punching 
shear would still be the same - 15.3 kips. For details see Table 3.4. 
 
 3.5.5 Conclusions  
 
 The biennual inspection data just provides a snapshot on the condition of the 
bridge and is therefore not always very useful. Continuous monitoring data indicated that 
delaminations led to large spalls. If flexible materials are used for repairs, they are unable 
to transfer wheel loads to the adjoining slab because of their low stiffness and localized 
failure can occurr at loads below the design load (Table 3.4). Measurements indicated 
that the thickness of the deck could be smaller than nominal dimensions at specified 
locations. Rainfall could have been a contributory factor in this case. 
Deck Failure 
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3.6  CrossTown Viaduct over Downtown Tampa. Bridge #100332 Span 70 
 
 This deck failure case occurred in the same bridge described in Section 3.5 but in 
span 70, (see Table 3.10 for general details). Span 70 is 65.5 ft long, and is built using 
type III AASHTO prestressed concrete girders. The girders are spaced center to center 6 
ft 5 in. 
4'6'
Full depth deck replacement Localized Deck Failure
Type III Girder
Bridge # 100332 Span 70
 
 
Figure 3.18    Cross Section View of Bridge #100332, Span 70 
 
3.6.1 Failure Details 
 
 Localized punching shear occurred in early morning, Friday September 5 2003. 
The failure was located close to the midspan and in the right lane. The failure region  
measured by the USF research team was estimated to be about 2 ft by 3 ft.    
 
 Photos of the failed section are shown in Fig. 3.19. A sketch showing the location 
of the failure in the deck is shownin Fig. 3.20. Initial spalling ahead of an M1 repair 
extended into the repair itself. Under subesequent loading, rebars were exposed in the 
spalled region. The concrete ultimately separated from the steel due to the impact of 
repeated wheel loads and a void formed. 
December 2002 Septemer 2003 
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 Fig. 3.19 has three photos. The main photo is a close-up plan view of the damage 
from the top of the deck. Note that the rebars are not broken nor plastically deformed. 
Small sections of concrete just separated from the reinforcement. One of the prestressing 
strands can be seen to be intact. A second photo provides an overview of the deck. The 
third photo shows the extent of the opening in the deck from the underside. Water 
staining is clearly visible. This failure was repaired by demolishing the whole bay where 
the failure occurred, and the one adjacent in the left lane, and placing a new deck using 
full depth cast in place concrete. 
 
    
Figure 3.19    Localized Deck Failure, Bridge #100332, Span 70 
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3.6.1.1 Newspaper Account 
 
 Two articles regarding the failure were reported in the local newspaper, Tampa 
Tribune [19,20]. The first article [19] published on September 9 2003 with the headline 
“Small Hole Paves Commuters' Way To A Traffic Jam”, makes reference to the large 
delays users are facing due to the deck failure. It also offered an explanation as to why 
the hole developed “Florida’s endless down pours opened a small hole in a bridge on the 
Lee Roy Selmon Expressway on Friday, creating a huge mess for morning rush hour 
commuters that won’t improve until Sunday”. 
Precast 
Panel
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42'
Pier 69
8'Pier 70
M1 Repair
Span 70
N
Full Depth 
Deck Replacement
65'
*Not To Scale
Spall
M1 Repair
Deteriorated 
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Deck Failure
9/5/2003 
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12' 4'
 
Figure 3.20   Location of Failed Panel, Bridge #100332 Span 70 
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The second article [20] published on September 10, 2003 with the headline “Time 
Catches Up With Expressway”. It stated that “The 3-square-foot hole was the site of an 
earlier temporary patch”. Pat McCue, executive director of the local expressway 
authority was quoted as saying “Truck traffic caused the layers to separate and crack in 
spots. Rainwater seeped into the cracks and, forced outward by the weight of traffic, 
crumbled the concrete, leaving a gaping hole”. Ben Muns, the expressway authority's 
chief engineer was quoted as saying "There's just no telling when the next one [hole] will 
be". 
 
3.6.2 Analysis 
  
3.6.2.1 Inspection Reports 
  
 The same five inspections reviewed for the previous failure in Span 38 describe 
the condition of the bridge over the eight year period from May ’93 to Aug. '01. As 
mentioned earlier, the reports provide information on the entire bridge and there is 
limited information relating to span 70 where failure occurred. Scanned excerpts from 
these inspection reports are summarized in Table 3.12 for completeness.  
 
 Additional monthy inspections (Table 3.13) noted that deterioration of the section 
that eventually failed was first observed on August 12 2003. It was described as a new 2' 
x 1' x 1" spall and delamination area with exposed steel. This had not been observed in 
the previous inspection carried out a month early on July 10. 
 
 Fig. 3.21 provides a photographic record of the events leading to failure. The first 
photo, A shows a  3 ft x 1 ft x 1.5 in spall that was observed 14 months prior to failure. 
The second photo, B, shows M1 repair carried out 8 months prior to failure. The last 
photo, C shows a spall developing ahead of the M1 repair taken 23 days before failure on 
August 12, 2001.  The next picture in the sequence can be seen in Fig. 3.19 where the 
failed section can be seen. 
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Table 3.12    Excerpts from Inspection Reports (Bridge #100332 Span 70)  
 FDOT Bridge Inspection Report (Deck) 
8/
29
/0
3 
 
08
/2
9/
01
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Table 3.12    (Continued) 
 FDOT Bridge Inspection Report (Deck) 
08
/3
1/
99
 
 
 
 
08
/2
6/
97
 
 
05
/1
5/
95
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Table 3.12    (Continued) 
 FDOT Bridge Inspection Report (Deck) 
05
/2
0/
93
 
  
 
 
 
 
B 
A 
Bridge # 100332  
Date:  7/31/02 
Span 70, lane 1 
Spall, 3 ft x 12 in 1.5 in, with exposed steel.  
INCREASE.  
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Figure 3.21    Deck Spall Bridge # 100332, Span 70. A) Initial spall 14 months          
                      before failure  B) M1 repair over initial spall 8 months before failure,  
                      C) Spall next to the M1 repair, 23 days before failure 
 
Table 3.13   Excerpts from Monthly Inspection Reports (Bridge #100332)  
8/
12
/0
3 
 
7/
10
/0
3 
 
 
3.6.3 Environmental Conditions 
 
 The precipitation readings at Tampa International Airport (6 miles from the 
bridge) over a one month period prior to failure are shown in Fig. 3.22. Total rainfall one 
week before failure was about 1.1 inches. Two days before failure, rainfall of 0.8 in. was 
registered, 0.3 in. rain fell on the day of the failure. Thus, rain may have been a factor in 
C 
No reference to the spot that failed  
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degrading the concrete reinforcement bond that led to concrete pieces separating from the 
steel and creating a void in the deck. For the record, on the day of the failure, the 
temperature varied from a minimum of 74°F to a maximum 79°F.   
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Figure 3.22    Tampa International Airport Precipitation (Aug 6 – Sep 5 2003) 
 
3.6.4 Punching Shear Analysis 
 
 The localized failure occurred within the panel. Consequently, two-way shear 
resistance was provide by three edges Table 3.14 summarizes the calculated punching 
shear values for the two extreme cases - full composite and panel slab only. It may be 
seen that the value of the failure load is higher in this case (21.7 kips vs 15.3 kips, Table 
3.4). A photograph of the underside of the panel shows water damage and longitudinal 
cracking within the assumed region providing resistance. Thus, assumption of support 
from three surfaces is perhaps on the optimistic side in this situation.   
 
 
 
 
Deck Failure 
Tampa International Airport Precipitation 
(8/6/2003 to 9/5/2003) 
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Table 3.14   Punching Shear Resistance Bridge # 100332 Span 70 
Load Case (Panel Edge) Punching Shear  
Resistance* 
Full Composite Action 
4" * 6.56"
6/8" Rebar
1.87"
* Average values
3/8" Strand
Vertical Crack
3" * Fiberboard 
Bearing
20"
Tire Contact area:         b=20in     l = 10 in
 
CIP 
de = 4 in. 
b0 = 58 in. 
VCIP= 50.8 kips 
PANEL 
de = 2.56 in. (ave) 
VPANEL = 41.4 kips 
VTOTAL = 92.2 kips 
No Composite Action   
7"
(
rib
)
3.06"(
panel
)
2.06"
(
rib
)
3.5"(
panel
)
2.0"
Fiberboard 
bearing
3/8" Strand
20"
Contact area
Tire Contact area:         b=20in     l = 10 in 
CIP 
VCIP= 0 kips 
PANEL 
de = 2.06 in. (min) 
b0 = 54.12 in. 
VPANEL = 21.7 kips 
VTOTAL = 21.7 kips 
* See Appendix A for detailed calculations. 
 
3.6.5 Conclusions 
 Biennual inspection records were of limited value. However, monthly inspection 
records for this bridge provides a photographic record of the sequence in which failure 
occurs (see Fig. 3.21 and Fig. 3.19). Again, failure was due to re-repair regions. Punching 
shear failure loads assuming resistance was provided from three surfaces overestimated 
the failure load. The condition of the underside of the bridge, especially if it shows signs 
of water stains may indicate impending localized failure.  For this bridge, rainfall was a 
contributory factor as there was a fair amount of rain just prior to failure (see Fig. 3.22).  
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 3.7   Summary and Conclusions 
 
 This chapter provided detailed information on five localized failures in panel deck 
bridges that occurred over the period between February 2000 and September 2003. These  
occurred at two locations - Sarasota and Tampa. One other failure was mentioned in the 
local newspaper (Section 3.2.1.1) in bridge #170146 but no records of this could be 
found.  
 
 The primary goal of this chapter was to identify underlying trends that led to 
failure in order to develop a rational deterioration and failure mechanism of these bridges. 
To this end, attention was focussed on where failures occurred, inspection and 
environmental information. The principal conclusions are summarized below:   
  
3.7.1 Failure Trend 
 
 National Bridge Inventory deck condition rating (Table 3.15) was found to be a 
poor indicator for predicting panel deck failures. All bridges that failed were rated 
between 5 (satisfactory) to 7 (good). Inspection records give a periodic snapshot on the 
condition of the bridge. Whereas biennial inspection data were generally unable to 
predict failure, monthly inspection records were far more successful in tracking problems 
that led to failure (see Table 3.15, Figs. 3.21/3.20). Based on the information provided in 
the inspection records for the five failures, the sequence leading to failure may be 
summarized as shown in Fig. 3.23. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.23    Simplified Deck Deterioration Process 
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Transverse 
Class 1 cracking – 
Unchanged  for 
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Repair deterioration / 
Re-repair / FAILURE 
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 The simplified model indicates that longitudinal cracks first develop along the 
girder lines. This is followed by occasional reflective transverse cracking. Such defects 
appear within 5 years of construction. These cracks may not change for nearly 10 years 
(Tables 3.3, 3.6, 3.9) after which there is more widespread transverse cracking. 
Longitudinal and transverse cracking result in spalling, delamination that require repair. 
In most cases, such damage occurs in regions where the panel is improperly supported on 
fiberboard. Depending on the materials and quality of the repair the deck can perform 
poorly or satifactorily. Where deck repairs are combined with proper panel bearing, e.g.  
by injecting epoxy, repairs are satisfactory. Where this is not carried out, and repairs are 
limited to surface repairs, there is progressive degradation (Fig. 3.21/3.20) which can lead 
to failure. In several instances, failures occurred at locations where temporary repairs had 
not been replaced.  
 Simplified calculations show that punching failures could result at loads below 
the design wheel load. This assumed the cast-in-place deck to provide no resistance and 
the panel to be supported on fiberboard with well developed cracking along the 
transverse and longitudinal panel boundaries. The failure load was calculated to be 
around 15 kips (Table 3.4). Otherwise, failure loads were nearly four times higher. 
 
Table 3.15   Inspection Record 
Bridge 
# 
Conditon 
Rating 
Last 
Inspection 
# of Rainfall events 
in past 7 days 
Comments 
170146 6  
(Satisfactory)  3  months  0 Not identified 
170086 7 
 (Good) 6 months  
2  
(0.68 in) Not identified 
170085 7 
 (Good) 7 months  
4 
(0.2 in.) Identified 
100332 5  
(Fair) 2 days 
2 
(0.55 in.) Identified 
100332 5  (Fair) 23 days 
3 
(1.1 in.) Identified 
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3.7.2 Environmental Factors 
 
 In four out of the five cases there was rainfall prior to failure (Table 3.15). The 
most severe rainfall preceded the last failure (1.1 in.). Also, photos of the underside of the 
bridges that failed show water stains (see Figs. 3.7, 3.14, 3.19). The exact role of 
rainwater is not known. However, given that the concrete in the deck separates cleanly 
from the reinforcement (e.g. Fig. 3.19), it probably adversely affects bond and degrades 
the cohesiveness of the cement paste. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that rainfall 
accelerates existing damage that can result in failure. 
 
3.7.3 Failure Location 
 
 All failures occurred under the wheel loads applied close to the face of the girders 
where initial longitudinal cracks developed.  Also in all five cases, the failure occurred in 
the right lane, i.e. slow lane (Table 3.16). Failure was generally in the edge or corner 
panels whose boundaries developed reflective longitudinal and transverse cracking. 
 
Table 3.16   Failure Comparison 
Bridge # 
 
Year 
Built 
Age at 
Failure 
(yrs) 
ADT 
(ADTT) 
 
Failure 
Size 
Location in 
Panel Comment 
170146 1981 19  34,000 (30%) 
18 in x 
24 in 
Edge or 
Corner? Failure at M1 repair 
170086 1980 20 34,000 (30%) 
36 in x 
60 in Corner Support Patch  repair 
170085 1980 20 34,000 (30%) 
18 in x 
18 in Corner 
Failure adjacent to M1 
repair 
100332 1980 22 23,000 (8%) 
48 in x 
30 in Near corner Asphalt Patch 
100332 1980 23 23,000 (8%) 
24 in x 
36 in Edge 
Failed M1 repair with 
flexible patch material  
   * National Bridge Inventory condition rating given in the bridge inspection prior to the deck failure 
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3.7.4  Bridge Characteristics  
 
 All failures occurred in bridges where the deck was nominally 7 in. thick. No 
failures occurred in deck panel bridges with thicker slabs. The ADTT varied between 8-
30% (Table 3.16). 
 
 Also it may be noted that the failures occurred in two twin bridges (NB and SB - 
170086, 170085), and in a bridge adjacent to these two (170146). It is very likely that 
these three bridges were built with similar defects by the same contractor. The other two 
cases also occurred in the same bridge (100332 spans 38 and 70). 
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CHAPTER 4. FORENSIC INVESTIGATION 
 
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
 
 In the previous chapter, five reported failures were investigated with a view 
towards identifying underlying trends that could be used to predict future failures. This 
chapter describes on-site investigations that were carried out to pursue the same 
objective: to gain enhanced understanding of the degradation process. In the study, 
several panel deck bridges scheduled for replacement during 2003-2004 and located 
within easy driving of the USF campus were investigated. A list of these bridges is given 
in Table 4.1.  
Table 4.1   Forensic Studies 
Bridge # District Built Study Date Bridge Location 
130078 1 1981 6/03 I-75 SB over Moccasin Wallow Rd (Manatee 
County) 
130079 1 1981 6/03 I-75 NB over  Moccasin Wallow Rd (Manatee 
County) 
170140 1 1981 1/04 I-75 NB over  Toledo Blade Blvd (Sarasota County) 
130075 1 1981 5/04 1-75 SB over CSR R/R (Manatee County) 
100415 7 1983 6/04 I-75NB over US 92 (Hillsborough County) 
100398 7 1984 6/04 I-75NB over Sligh & Ramp D-1 (Hillsborough 
County) 
100417 7 1983 7/04 I-75NB over Ramp B-1 (Hillsborough County) 
130085 1 1981 8/04 I-75NB  over SR-64 (Sarasota County) 
 
 The bridges included in this forensic study were scheduled for a complete deck 
replacement for a variety of reasons not necessarily related to the state of disrepair. As a 
result, both badly deteriorated and those not so badly deteriorated decks were 
investigated. This made it possible to investigate the condition of the decks at different 
stages of deterioration.  
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 The aim of the investigation was to compile a photographic record of the 
deterioration that could be used in developing a rational failure model. Forensic 
inspection methods were designed to obtain maximum information with minimal 
disruption to the contractor. The specific information of interest is summarized in Section 
4.2. Self-standing sections relating to each bridge in Table 4.1 is presented in Sections 
4.3-4.10.  
 
 The investigations reported could not have been carried out without the 
cooperation and unconditional assistance of the deck replacement contractors: Zep 
Constructions Inc. and AIM Engineering & Surveying.  
 
4.2  Objectives 
 
 The main objective was to obtain first hand evidence on actual deck deterioration 
in order to get a better understanding of how deficiencies are initiated and how they 
propagate in typical deck panel bridges.  
 Specific information of interest was for identifying conditions that resulted in: 
  
1.   No deck cracking. 
2.   Longitudinal deck surface cracks. 
3.   Transverse deck surface cracks. 
4.   Deck surface spalling including “walking” spalls. 
5.   Deficient M1 repairs.  
6.   Underside longitudinal and transverse panel cracking.  
7.   Condition of fiberboard bearing. 
8.   Effect of epoxy panel bearing. 
9.   Effect of different wheel locations. 
 
 Not all the information could be retrieved from a single bridge given that they 
were in different states of disrepair.  In the sections that follow the same basic format will 
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be followed: a description of the bridge that was replaced followed by the inspection 
method used and the principal findings.  
  
4.3 I-75 NB and SB over Moccasin Wallow Rd. (Bridges #130079, #130078) 
 
 The replacement of the deck in these twin bridges was carried out in June 2003 by 
Zep Constructions. In three weeks, the existing panel deck was removed and replaced by 
a full-depth cast in place concrete slab. In all a deck area of 35,680 sq. ft was replaced.    
 
4.3.1 Bridge Details 
 
 The I-75 NB and SB bridges over Moccasin Wallow in District 1 are located in 
Manatee County, a few miles north of the I-75 - I-275 intersection. These 3-span bridges 
were built in 1981 and were in service for nearly 23 years before replacement. Each 
bridge has two approximately 100 ft. long main spans (span 2, span 3) and two 45 ft long 
secondary spans (span 1, span 4). The total length is about 290 ft.  
 
 In the north bound bridge, the shorter spans were built using two AASHTO Type 
IV girders on the outside and six AASHTO Type II girders on the inside all spaced 9 ft 3 
1/2 in. apart. For the main span, nine AASHTO Type IV girders are spaced at 8 ft 1 1/2 in 
on centers as shown in Fig. 4.1. In the south bound bridge, the shorter spans use two 
AASHTO Type IV girders on the outside and five AASHTO Type II girders on the inside 
all spaced 8 ft 10 in. apart. In the main span, seven AASHTO Type IV girders are spaced 
at 8 ft 10 in on centers. 
 
 The deck had a 7.5 in. thick concrete slab with the precast panel component being 
either 2-½ in. or 3-½ in. (at the rib-section) thick as shown in Fig. 4.2. The specified 
compressive strength of concrete for the precast panel is 5,000 psi. It is 3,000 psi for the 
cast in place concrete slab.  
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 The bridge has three 12 ft wide lanes, and 10 ft wide shoulders as shown in Fig. 
4.1. There is an auxiliary lane that merges with traffic entering the interstate from I-275. 
These dimensions and the bridge cross-section are typical of all panel deck bridges in 
Districts 1 and 7 excepting that the deck thickness (7.5 in.) is slightly greater than the 7 
in. norm. 
 
 In general the deck was in reasonable condition in both bridges with typical 
longitudinal and transverse cracking. Some regions had deteriorated and both M1 Repairs 
and spalling were present.  
 
Table 4.2   Bridges #130078 and #130079 [27] 
 Bridge #130078 (SB) Bridge #130079 (NB) 
Year Built 1981 1981 
Number of Spans 4 4 
Lanes on Structure 3 4 
ADT  (2003) 26,500 27,000 
Percent Truck (ADTT) 30% 30% 
Composite Slab Thickness 7-½ in. 7-½ in 
Precast Panel Thickness 2-½ in (panel) 3-½ in (ribs) 2-½ in (panel) 3-½ in (ribs) 
Girder Type AASHTO Type II and IV AASHTO Type II and IV 
Deck Condition Rating 
(2003) 7 (Good Condition) 7 (Good Condition) 
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Figure 4.2    Composite Deck Section 
 
4.3.2  Inspection Method 
 
 As several panels (Fig. 4.3) had already been removed when I was able to access 
the site, three different procedures were to optimize the investigation. This involved (1) 
examination of already removed panels from the southbound bridge, (2) inspection of 
panels that had been identified prior to their removal and (3) inspection of panels in-place 
after adjoining panels had been removed. The last scenario provides the best information 
but is rarely possible since it can interfere with the contractor’s work. 
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Figure 4.1   Cross Section View of Bridge #130078  
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 A quick visual inspection was conducted to identify panels that exhibited typical 
deficiencies and a detailed was done with all the information collected in the form of 
photographs, sketches and field notes. Care was taken to isolate existing deficiencies 
from those induced by the removal process. 
 
 
Figure 4.3   Removed Deck Sections from SB Bridge #130079 
  
 This was undertaken for the east (right) half of the northbound bridge. Following 
a quick inspection of the deck regions of special interest were identified (Fig. 4.4). These 
included sections with well defined typical deficiencies as well those with no apparent 
defects. A total of six panel sections were marked and removed. The average dimension 
of these sections was 8 ft by 10 ft.  
 
 The contractor removed the marked sections taking extra care to minimize 
additional damage and then stored them at an assigned place for subsequent detailed 
inspection.  
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Figure 4.4    Marked Deck Sections Removed From NB  Bridge#130078 
 
 Inspection of these marked sections included detailed visual examination, crack 
survey of the deck surface and the cross section, and extraction of concrete cores (Fig. 
4.5) from locations of special interest. A total of 15 cores were taken from the 6 deck 
sections.  Please refer to Appendix  B for detailed information on these deck cores.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5    Coring of Marked Sections 
 
 
 To eliminate any doubt that the crack patterns were induced by the removal process, 
insitu inspection was instituted wherein deck sections were examined prior to their 
removal. This provided authentic information on crack propagation through the thickness 
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of the deck.  As mentioned earlier, this was possible when adjacent sections had already 
been removed to allow access to the vertical faces of the section. This inspection 
confirmed that the condition of the deck deficiencies was unaffected by the removal 
process.  
 
4.3.3  Findings 
 
  Fig. 4.6 is a schematic drawing highlighting some of the findings. It provides 
details of their location in the deck cross section and also cross-refers to figure numbers 
where photographs of the particular deficiencies are provided.  
 
 In the following sections, detailed information is provided for each of the following 
findings some of which are shown in Fig. 4.6. These are: 
 
1. No Deck Surface Cracking 
2. Longitudinal Deck Surface Cracking 
3. Transverse Deck Surface Cracking 
4. Additional Longitudinal Cracking 
5. Deck Spalling and Delamination. 
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Figure 4.6   Overview of Findings from Bridge # 130079 
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4.3.3.1  No Deck Surface Cracking 
 
  Fig. 4.7 shows a retrieved panel with no surface cracking. The location of the 
prestressed girder support and the bearing pad has been drawn to provide better 
understanding.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7    No Deck Surface Cracking 
  
 Inspection of Fig. 4.7 shows that there is separation of the precast panel from the 
cast-in-place concrete slab possibly due to long term differential creep and shrinkage 
movement. This separation is of about 5 mm wide.  
 
 There is a vertical crack emanating from the corner of the panel that does not 
propagate all the way to the deck surface. This could because the effect of creep and 
differential shrinkage was lower for this case, e.g. lower effective prestress, smaller age 
difference between casting of the panel and CIP deck. 
 
 
 
Precast Panel 
C.I.P 
No Cracks 
Panel Side Face 
Separation 
Vertical Crack 
Prestressed Girder 
Panel Bearing 
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4.3.3.2  Deck Surface Longitudinal Cracking 
 
 This is the most common deficiency observed in precast deck panel bridges found 
in almost all the deck panel bridges. 
 
 Fig. 4.8 shows how a typical longitudinal crack develops. This picture was taken 
with the panel in place in the bridge after the adjoining panel had been removed. The 
prestressed girder shown is the actual girder which supported the panel. The fiberboard 
bearing support is also visible. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8    Development of Deck Surface Longitudinal Crack 
 
 Inspection of Fig. 4.8 shows clear separation of the vertical interface between the 
panel and the cast in place slab, i.e. the face of the panel completely debonded from the 
cast in place concrete. A vertical crack emanates from the top corner of the precast panel 
and propagates to the top of the deck. This pattern is replicated along the entire edge of 
the pane creating reflective longitudinal cracking on the deck surface.  
Prestresed  Girder 
Very thin fiber board 
bearing 
Typical Longitudinal crack 
Bonded interface 
Vertical crack 
Separation at 
panel face 
Saw Cut 
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 It is important to recognize that this type of cracking can even be found on the 
shoulders of the bridge where live load is minimal. Thus, this type of cracking is not 
related to live load. 
 
 Also for this case and for all the sections inspected it was found that a very good 
bonded interface existed between the top face of the panel and the cast in place concrete. 
This indicates that composite action under bending loads. 
 
4.3.3.3  Deck Surface Transverse Cracking 
 
 Transverse deck surface cracking is not as common as longitudinal cracking. In 
most cases this is a hairline crack and it tends to remain stable without causing any 
further damage. In the forensic examination it can only be detected from sections that 
have been removed (Fig. 4.9). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9    Deck Surface Transverse Crack Panel 
Traffic Direction 
Transverse Crack 
Panel Panel 
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 In Fig. 4.9 the location of the two adjoining panels has been drawn to provide 
better understanding. Cracking emanates at the joint and eventually propagates to the 
deck surface. Thus, it is a reflective crack that maps the location of the transverse panel 
joint on the deck surface. Where it does not reach the top surface, no cracking is visible.  
 
4.3.3.4  Additional Longitudinal Cracking 
   
In addition to the typical longitudinal crack running over the edge of the panels 
(See 4.3..3.3) another type of longitudinal cracking was found. This crack runs about 4 in. 
parallel to typical longitudinal cracks (Fig. 4.10).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.10    Additional Longitudinal Cracking  
 
 This additional longitudinal cracking is caused by a bifurcation of the vertical 
crack emanating from the corner of the precast panel. It propagates at an angle of less 
than 45 degrees to reach the deck surface, generating an additional longitudinal crack on 
the deck surface.  
 
 
Additional Longitudinal 
cracking 
Typical Longitudinal 
cracking 
Precast deck panel 
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This type of crack is not as common as the typical longitudinal crack; it is only 
found in localized regions of the deck whereas other cracks tend to occur along the entire 
span. Also it was found that this additional cracking only occurs when a wheel load is 
located close to the panel support (see Fig. 4.6). 
 
4.3.3.5  Deck Spalling and Delamination 
 
 This is one of the most important deficiencies in deck panel bridges. In the previous 
chapter examples are provided where sudden localized deck failures occurred at sites 
where temporary spalling repairs had been carried out. 
 
 The deck section analyzed was removed from span 3, bay 3 from the north bound 
bridge (see bridge cross section detail, Fig. 4.6). The spall was located right under the 
wheel load with the wheel load positioned at the edge of the girder. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.11    Development of a Deck Surface Spall 
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 In this specific case, the spalled area studied was located next to an existing M1 
repair. This is a common deficiency in deck panel bridges; it is also known as a “walking 
spall” because it always occurs next to a spall patch or repair. 
 
 Fig. 4.11 is a photograph of the retrieved panel. A prestressed girder is drawn to 
provide contextual reference. Inspection of Fig 4.11 shows that it has all of the cracks 
described earlier, i.e. panel separation, vertical crack, diagonal crack, but with an increase 
in width of the cracks and additionally more diagonal cracks under the spalled area. 
 
 The longitudinal and diagonal cracking causes the concrete surface to break up 
into small pieces that can be easily detached from the deck by traffic creating the spall. 
Deck deterioration starts to accelerate due to the impact of the wheel loads on the spall. 
 
4.3.3.6 Findings on Panel Bearings 
 
 Regarding the precast panel’s bearing it was found that the bridge was built using 
only fiberboard to support the panels (negative bearing), but recently only in some areas 
of the bridge the fiberboard bearing has been removed and replaced by epoxy. The 
replacement of the fiberboard by epoxy was recommended in a previous research study 
[11], as a method to reduce future deterioration of the bridge deck, but exactly in the 
spots where the major deterioration was found, the fiberboard had not been replaced by 
epoxy.  
 
4.3.3.7 Findings on Core Examination 
  
 Most of the cracks found on the cores show signs of water and dust infiltration ( 
Cores 1-3, 1-4, 5-4, 5-6, 5-7) (Fig. 4.12). In the case of vertical cracks, some of them 
show these signs only over half the depth indicating that the prestressed slab was 
uncracked. But when the section deteriorated, infiltration occurred over the entire deck 
depth (Cores 5-6, 5-7 ). 
 
 In most of cases (cores 1-3, 1-4), concrete at the top of diagonal crack was 
crumbled and showed signs of water infiltration. 
 79 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.12    Crumbled Concrete in Top of a Diagonal Crack. (Core 1-3) 
 
 
 M1 repairs debonded only near the panel edges in the vertical direction as well as 
at its horizontal interface with the cast-in-place slab (core 1-1, 1-2, 5-4, 5-5 ). Along the 
longitudinal interface away from the panel edge there was no debonding (cores 5-3) 
 
 The depth of the deck, measured at each core location, varied from 7 ¾ in to 8 ½ 
in. See Appendix B for a detail description of each core. 
 
4.4  I-75 NB over N Toledo Blade Blvd. (Bridge #170140) 
 
 The deck replacement of this bridge was performed in January 2004 by Zep 
Constructions Inc. Fort Myers FL. At that time the bridge was widened and an additional 
12 ft lane added on the left side.  
 
4.4.1 Bridge Details 
 
 This 3-span bridge located in Sarasota County, FL was built in 1981. Its deck was 
in service for 23 years before replacement. The bridge has a main span (span 2) of 107 ft 
8 in. and two 41 ft secondary spans (span 1, span 3). Its overall length is 189 ft 8 in. 
 
Diagonal 
Crack 
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Panel 
Crumbled 
Concrete 
C.I.P 
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  The shorter spans were built using two AASHTO Type IV girders on the outside 
and three AASHTO Type II girders on the inside all spaced 9 ft 3 in. apart. In the main 
span, seven AASHTO Type IV girders are spaced at 6 ft 2 in on centers as shown in Fig. 
4.12.  
 
 The deck has a 7.5 in. thick concrete slab with the precast panel component being 
either 2-½ in. or 3-½ in. (at the rib-section) thick as shown in Fig. 4.2. The specified 
compressive strength of concrete for the precast panel is 5,000 psi. It is 3,000 psi for the 
cast in place concrete slab.  
Table 4.3    Bridge #170140  
Bridge #170140 Characteristics 
Year Built 1981 
Number of Spans 3 
Lanes on Structure 2 
ADT  (2003) 19,000 
Percent Truck (ADTT) 30% 
Composite Slab Thickness 7-½ in. 
Precast Panel Thickness 2-½ in (panel) 3-½ in (ribs) 
Girder Type AASHTO Type II and IV 
Deck Condition Rating (2003) 7 (Good Condition) 
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Figure 4.13    Cross Section View of Bridge #170140 
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 The bridge has two 12 ft wide lanes, a 10 ft wide shoulder on the right of the 
traffic, and a 6 ft shoulder on the left, as shown in Fig. 4.13. It is in District 1 and is 
located 30 miles south of Sarasota.  
 
 The part of the bridge where the study was conducted was in apparent good 
condition. It only exhibited typical longitudinal and some transverse cracking. No 
previous repairs were found on the deck. 
 
4.4.2  Inspection Method 
  
 The methodology used for this bridge was the same as the one used on the I-75 
NB over Moccasin Wallow. Deck sections of special interest were marked for careful 
removal and subsequent detailed inspection (Fig. 4.14). However, no cores were 
extracted from the deck sections.  
 
      
                    
A) Marked section                                              B) Removed section 
 
Figure 4.14    View of Bridge #170140 
 
 
4.4.3  Findings 
 
 An examination of the retrieved panels confirmed the findings from the previous 
bridge. Longitudinal cracks emanated from the corner of the prestressed panel and 
propagated through the slab thickness to emerge as visible cracks (Fig. 4.16a, 4.16b). 
Additional parallel cracking due to divergence of the crack emanating from the panel 
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corner was also observed. However, the parallel cracking on the deck surface only 
appeared intermittently as shown in Fig. 4.16c.  
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Figure 4.15    Findings Overview, Bridge # 170140 
 
 
 As before, there was separation between the precast panel and the cast-in-place slab 
at its vertical interface. This was suspected to be due to long term creep and shrinkage as 
stated earlier. An example was also found of the deck panel being supported by epoxy 
instead of fiberboard. In this instance, the extent of the longitudinal cracking was reduced 
(Fig. 4.16d). Overall, there were no dramatic new findings, simply confirmation of what 
was found earlier. 
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              (a) Longitudinal Cracking                               (b) Longitudinal Cracking 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         (c) Additional Longitudinal Cracking                       (d) Epoxy Support                                   
 
Figure 4.16    Retrieved Panels from Bridge #170140 
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4.5  I-75 SB over CSX R/R. (Bridge #130075) 
 
 The deck replacement of this bridge was performed in May 2004 by Zep 
Constructions Inc. Fort Myers FL.  
 
4.5.1 Bridge Details 
 
 This 3-span bridge located in Sarasota County, FL was built in 1981. Its deck was 
in service for 23 years before replacement. The bridge has a main span (span 2) of 79 ft 2  
in and two 45 ft 5 in secondary spans (span 1, span 3). Its overall length is 170 ft. 
  The shorter spans were built using two AASHTO Type III girders on the outside 
and five AASHTO Type II girders on the inside all spaced 8 ft 10 in. apart as shown in 
Fig. 4.16. For the main span, nine AASHTO Type III girders are spaced at 6 ft 7½ in on 
centers.  
 The deck has a 7.5 in. thick concrete slab with the precast panel component being 
either 2-½ in. or 3-½ in. (at the rib-section) thick as shown in Fig. 4.2. The specified 
compressive strength of concrete for the precast panel is 5,000 psi. It is 3,000 psi for the 
cast in place concrete slab.  
 
Table 4.4    Bridge #130075 [27] 
Bridge #130075 Characteristics 
Year Built 1981 
Number of Spans 3 
Lanes on Structure 3 
ADT  (2003) 36,500 
Percent Truck (ADTT) 30% 
Composite Slab Thickness 7-½ in. 
Precast Panel Thickness 2-½ in (panel) 3-½ in (ribs) 
Girder Type AASHTO Type II and III 
Deck Condition Rating (2003) 5 (Fair Condition) 
 85 
Bridge Number 130075 Secondary Span
Bay 6Bay 5Bay 4Bay 3Bay 2Bay 1
2'-10 12" 
8'-10"8'-10"8'-10"8'-10"8'-10"8'-10"
2'-10 12" 
12'
10' 10'
12'
Lane 2 Lane 3
12'
Lane 1
 
Figure 4.17    Cross Section View of Bridge #130075 
 
 The bridge has three 12 ft wide lanes, and 10 ft wide shoulders, as shown in Fig. 
4.17. It is in District 1 and is located 2 miles north of Ellenton.  
  
 From the inspection performed before the deck removal, typical longitudinal and 
transverse cracking plus various M1 repairs, some of them stable and some unstable. (Fig 
4.18) were found. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.18    Deck Overview of Bridge #130075 
Bays covered in 
 the study 
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4.5.2  Inspection Method 
 
 This bridge was not part of the original investigation. Access was arranged at the 
last minute when much of the deck had already been removed. In view of this a different 
approach had to be employed. 
 
 In the modified approach there was no time for marking sections and then having 
them carefully removed by the contractor. Consequently, it was necessary to perform a 
quick inspection to locate and document major deck deficiencies. Following this 
inspection, each deck section was inspected in place after the adjoining section had been 
removed (Fig. 4.19a). Also deck sections that had been removed were also inspected, Fig. 
4.19b.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.19    Inspection Methods Bridge #130075 
 
4.5.3 Findings 
 
 As in previous examinations, panel face separation, and vertical cracking other 
typical cracking described in detail earlier were detected (see Fig. 4.20). New information 
relating to panel support was found. 
 
 Fig. 4.20 is a view of a section of the panel deck and the prestressed girder. The 
panel on the left is supported by epoxy while the section on the right is on fiberboard 
Thus, the replacement was partial and not over the entire deck as recommended in a 
(a) (b) 
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previous research study [14]. Inspection of Fig. 4.20 shows that when epoxy was used to 
replace the fiberboard bearing it only penetrated over approximately one third the bearing 
width leaving a region that was unsupported (bay 3). Note the emergence of a vertical 
crack from this unsupported region. A similar crack appears from the edge of the 
fiberboard support on the right (bay 2). This was more heavily loaded and required an M1 
repair. The divergence of the vertical crack causes separation of the interface between the 
M1 repair and the panel that cannot act compositely under flexural loading. The 
deterioration is more severe in bay 2 because of a combination of heavier loads and 
fiberboard supports. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.20    Deck Cross Section View over Girder # 3 
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Figure 4.21    Panel Bearing Condition, over Girder # 3 
 
 
 Due to the examination of the deck sections before removal, it was possible to 
prove that the typical cracking found in this bridge and in previous cases is not caused by 
the deck removal process.  
  
4.6  I-75 NB over US 92. (Bridge #100415) 
 
 The deck replacement of this bridge was performed in June 2004 by AIM 
Engineering & Surveying. This was conducted simultaneously with two other deck panel 
bridges (#100398 #100417) that are part of I-75- I-4 interchange. 
 
4.6.1 Bridge Details 
 
 This 3-span bridge located in Hillsborough County, FL was built in 1983. Its deck 
was in service for nearly 21 years before replacement. The bridge has a main span (span 
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2) of 107 ft. and two 40 ft 7in secondary spans (span 1, span 3). Its overall length is 188 
ft 2 in. Only the main span (span 2) was built using precast deck panels, the other spans 
being built using full depth cast in place concrete.  
 
  The shorter spans used two AASHTO Type IV girders on the outside and five 
AASHTO Type II girders on the inside all spaced 10 ft 1 in. apart. The main span has ten 
AASHTO Type IV girders spaced about 6 ft 9 in on centers as shown in Fig. 4.21.  
 
 The deck has a 7.5 in. thick concrete slab with the precast panel component being 
either 2-½ in. or 3-½ in. (at the rib-section) thick as shown in Fig. 4.2. The specified 
compressive strength of concrete for the precast panel is 5,000 psi. It is 3,000 psi for the 
cast in place concrete slab.  
Table 4.5    Bridge #100415 
Bridge #100415 Characteristics 
Year Built 1983 
Number of Spans 3 (only span 2 –deck panel) 
Lanes on Structure 4 
ADT  (2003) 43,000 
Percent Truck (ADTT) 30% 
Composite Slab Thickness 7-½ in. 
Precast Panel Thickness 2-½ in (panel) 3-½ in (ribs) 
Girder Type AASHTO Type II and IV 
Deck Condition Rating (2003) 5 (Fair Condition) 
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Figure 4.22    Cross Section View of Bridge #100415 span 2 
 
 This bridge has three main lanes, a 12 ft wide auxiliary lane, and two shoulders – 
one 6 ft wide and the other 10 ft as shown in Fig. 4.22. It is in District 7.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.23    Bridge #100415 Span 2, Prior to Deck Removal  
 
 The forensic study was conducted on span 2, bays 1 to 5. This section of the 
bridge exhibited longitudinal and some transverse cracking typical of deck panel 
construction. Also along bay 5, there were two deteriorated M1 repairs and several 
walking spall patches as shown in Fig. 4.23. This figure also identifies the cut patterns 
used by the contractor. 
* Bays covered on the study (1 – 5) 
M1 Repairs and 
walking spalls Cut patterns 
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4.6.2  Inspection Method 
  
 The intent was to follow the same procedure used in earlier forensic studies. 
However, the contractor used a different cut pattern (Fig. 4.24) and therefore regions of 
greatest interest (the supported edges of the panel along the girder lines) were not 
included in the removed section. Therefore analysis focused mainly on the deck sections 
that were left on the top of the girders. These provided information on the bearing support 
provided to the panels.  
 
 Before the deck was removed, a detailed inspection was conducted to document 
the deficiencies and to determine their exact location so that their position could be 
identified in the remaining deck section on the top of the girders. Special interest was 
placed on assessing the condition of the panel bearings along the bridge deck. The cut 
pattern used in this case (Fig 4.24) helped to provide a detailed and unaltered view on the 
deck bearing in most of the deck. The panel sections removed were also inspected but not 
much information was obtained from them. 
 
Precast Panel
      
Figure 4.24    Cross Section View of Cut Pattern on Bridge #100415 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 92 
 
4.6.3  Findings 
 
4.6.3.1 Deteriorated M1 Repair and Walking Spalls 
 
 Fig. 4.25 shows the location of the M1 repair and the walking spalls in bays 4 and 5 
in span 2. There are four numbered locations 1-4 in the plan view. These identify 
elevation views of the supporting girder and deck section after the panel had been cut out. 
The top left figure marked 1 shows the support for the panel at the M1 repair location. 
Note the longitudinal delamination in the cast-in-place (CIP) slab near the top. The figure 
marked 2 is a view of the panel after it was removed and placed on temporary barrier 
supports. The patch repairs and regions adjacent to it separated readily indicating loss of 
bond. The figure marked 3 is same as the one marked 1 except that it is located at a 
deteriorated region. A hammer top can be easily inserted indicating lack of bearing 
support and separation (also shown in the figure marked 4 where the concrete was 
removed. Separation of the vertical face (not visible) is also marked.  
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Figure 4.25    Examination of a Deteriorated Deck Section on Bridge #100415 
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4.6.3.2 Deck Panel Bearing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.26    Panel Bearing Examination on Bridge #100415 
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 Fig. 4.26 shows support for the panels at various locations along the bridge. Four 
pictures reflecting bearing locations marked 1-4 in the plan view are shown. The figure 
marked 1 shows a region where the slab was supported by 1 in. of fiberboard and 2 in. of 
concrete. This was unexpected from the Crosstown construction drawings and from 
previous research that indicated that the fiberboard was placed at the ends leaving no 
room for concrete to penetrate under the panel. Only vertical cracking was present in the 
panel with no delamination. Unfortunately, it cannot be seen because it was saw cut. The 
figures marked 2 and 3 show alternate locations where the concrete was unable to 
penetrate below the panel. The last figure, marked 4, also appearing in Fig. 4.25, shows 
lack of support that led to cracking and spalling of the deck. Thus, this figure provides 
evidence on the role of the bearing support on the performance of the deck. 
 
4.7  I-75 NB over Sligh Ave & Ramp D-1 (Bridge #100398) 
 
 The deck replacement of this bridge was performed in June 2004 by AIM 
Engineering & Surveying. This deck replacement was conducted simultaneously with 
two other deck panel bridges (#100415 #100417) that are part of I-75- I-4 interchange. 
 
4.7.1 Bridge Details 
 
 This 5-span bridge located in Hillsborough County, FL was built in 1984. Its deck 
was in service for nearly 20 years before replacement. The span lengths are as follows: 
Span 1 (south) 35 ft, Spans 2 and 3, 82 ft, Span 4, 54 ft 10 in, and Span 5 107 ft. Its 
overall length is 360 ft 10 in.  
 
  Span 1 has two AASHTO Type IV girders on the outside and six AASHTO Type 
II girders on the inside all spaced 10 ft 2 in. apart. Spans 2, 3 and 4, all have the same 
configuration as span 1 but used only girder type IV. The longest span (span 5) has 
eleven AASHTO Type IV girders spaced about 6 ft 7 ½ in on centers as shown in Fig. 
4.27. 
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Table 4.6    Bridge #100398 
Bridge #100398 Characteristics 
Year Built 1984 
Number of Spans 5 
Lanes on Structure 4 
ADT  (2003) 43,000 
Percent Truck (ADTT) 30% 
Composite Slab Thickness 7-½ in. 
Precast Panel Thickness 2-½ in (panel) 3-½ in (ribs) 
Girder Type AASHTO Type II and IV 
Deck Condition Rating (2003) 5 (Fair Condition) 
  
 The deck has a 7.5 in. thick concrete slab with the precast panel component being 
either 2-½ in. or 3-½ in. (at the rib-section) thick as shown in Fig. 4.2. The specified 
compressive strength of concrete for the precast panel is 5,000 psi. It is 3,000 psi for the 
cast in place concrete slab.  
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Figure 4.27    Cross Section View of Bridge #100398 
* Bays covered on the study (1 – 3) 
* Bays covered on the study (1 – 4) 
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 After the half of the bridge to be replaced was closed, a detailed inspection of the 
bridge deck was conducted. During this inspection, no major deterioration was found, 
only typical longitudinal and some transverse cracks typical of deck panel bridges. Also 
no signs of previous repairs were found. (Fig. 4.28). 
 
Figure 4.28    Deck Overview of Bridge #100398 
 
4.7.2  Inspection Method 
 
 Bearing in mind that in this bridge, the contractor did not use the same cut pattern as 
the ones used in the previous bridge (Fig. 4.24), (they used a cut pattern similar to the one 
used on Moccasin Wallow Bridge, (Fig. 4.8), plus the fact that this bridge deck only 
exhibited random cracking but no major deficiencies, a different inspection method was 
used. 
  
   
 
Figure 4.29    Inspection Methods Bridge #100398 
(a) (b) 
Deck Section to Be Replaced 
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 First, random sections previously removed were inspected to identify panel face 
separation, vertical cracking or other type of typical internal deterioration (Fig. 4.29a). 
Then a detailed inspection of the panel bearing over the edges of the girders was 
conducted (Fig. 4.29b). 
 
4.7.3      Findings  
 
 The most important finding was related to panel bearing support. It was found that 
the type of panel bearing used in this bridge was completely different, to the ones 
believed to be used in all deck panel bridges in Florida.  Here a positive bearing was 
provided by a layer of grout placed next to a 1 in. fiberboard strip (Fig. 4.30). This 
system provided a stiff support for the panel. Soft fiberboard bearing is known to be 
responsible for premature deterioration of Florida’s deck panel bridges [11]. 
 
 Keeping in mind that this bridge was built on 1984, it is likely that in this bridge the 
panel bearing detail was changed to a positive bearing to prevent deterioration that had 
been observed in panel deck bridges built earlier in this area. This is the main reason why 
this bridge deck did not exhibit major deterioration after 20 years of service.  
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 4.30    Panel Bearing Examination Bridge #100398 
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 Despite the use of positive panel bearing in this bridge, typical deterioration such as 
panel face separation and vertical cracking was observed (Fig. 4.31). This proves that this 
kind of cracking is not related to the type of bearing used to support the panel. Positive 
bearing only prevents the occurrence of additional shear cracking that causes spalling in 
the deck surface, and may lead to sudden failures. 
 
  
 
Figure 4.31    Vertical and Longitudinal Cracks Bridge #100398 
 
 Fig. 4.32 provides a summary of all the findings of the forensic investigation of 
bridge #100398. It shows the panel bearing detail used, and the typical panel face 
separation and vertical cracking found on in almost all the deck sections inspected on this 
bridge. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.32    Findings Overview Bridge #100398 
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4.8  I-75 NB over Ramp B-1 (Bridge #100417) 
 
 The deck replacement of this bridge was performed in June 2004 by AIM 
Engineering & Surveying. This deck replacement was conducted simultaneously with 
two other deck panel bridges (#100398 and #100415) that are part of I-75- I-4 
interchange. 
 
4.8.1  Bridge Details 
 
 This 3-span bridge located in Hillsborough County, FL was built in 1983. Its deck 
was in service for nearly 21 years before replacement. The bridge has a main span (span 
2) of 107 ft. and two 40 ft 7in secondary spans (span 1, span 3). Its overall length is 160 
ft 6 in.  
  The shorter spans used two AASHTO Type IV girders on the outside and four 
AASHTO Type II girders on the inside all spaced 10 ft 7-3/16 in. apart, except the center 
two spaced at 10 ft 7-1/4 in. The main span has seven AASHTO Type IV girders spaced 
about 8 ft 10 in on centers as shown in Fig. 4.33.  
 
 The deck has a 7.5 in. thick concrete slab with the precast panel component being 
either 2-½ in. or 3-½ in. (at the rib-section) thick as shown in Fig. 4.2. The specified 
compressive strength of concrete for the precast panel is 5,000 psi. It is 3,000 psi for the 
cast in place concrete slab.  
Table 4.7    Bridge #100417 
Bridge #100417 Characteristics 
Year Built 1983 
Number of Spans 3  
Lanes on Structure 3 
ADT  (2001) 48,290 
Percent Truck (ADTT) 30% 
Composite Slab Thickness 7-½ in. 
Precast Panel Thickness 2-½ in (panel) 3-½ in (ribs) 
Girder Type AASHTO Type II and IV 
Deck Condition Rating (2003) 5 (Fair Condition) 
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Figure 4.33    Cross Section View of Bridge #100417 span 2 
 
 This bridge has three main lanes, a 12 ft wide auxiliary lane, and two shoulders – 
both 10 ft wide as shown in Fig. 4.33. This bridge is part of District 7.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.34    Deck Before Removal Bridge # 100417 (Bays 4-6) 
 
 
 After the half of the bridge to be replaced was closed, a detailed inspection of the 
bridge deck was conducted. During this inspection only typical longitudinal cracks along 
the entire deck and some transverse cracks were found. Both are typical of deck panel 
construction. Also no signs of previous repairs were found (Fig. 4.34). 
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4.8.2     Findings  
 
 In this bridge was found exactly the same type of panel bearing detail as in the 
previous bridge (Section 4.7). Here a positive bearing was provided by a layer of grout 
placed next to a 1 in. fiberboard strip (Fig. 4.35). This system provided a stiff support for 
the panel. Soft fiberboard bearing is known to be responsible for premature deterioration 
of Florida’s deck panel bridges [11]. 
 
 The use of positive panel bearing in this bridge is believed to be the reason why it 
did not exhibit major deterioration after 20 years of service. 
 
    
 
Figure 4.35    Panel Bearing Examination Bridge #100417 
 
 It was also found the longitudinal cracks observed in the inspection conducted, were 
caused, as found in all the pervious studies, due to separation of the vertical face of the 
panel (Fig. 4.36). It is again proven that the presence of deck surface longitudinal 
cracking is related only to the use of precast panels regardless the type of panel bearing 
used, whereas the occurrence of spalls or additional cracking directly linked to the type of 
bearing used (negative bearing). 
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 Figure 4.36    Panel Bearing Examination Bridge #100417 
 
 Fig. 4.37 provides a summary of all the findings of the forensic investigation of 
bridge #100417. It shows the panel bearing detail used, and the typical panel face 
separation and vertical cracking found on in almost all the deck sections inspected on this 
bridge. 
 
 ` 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.37    Findings Overview Bridge #100417 
 
 
4.9  I-75 NB Over SR 64 (Bridge #130085) 
 
 The deck replacement of this bridge was performed in August 2004 by Zep 
Constructions Inc. Fort Myers FL. In about three weeks, the existing panel deck was 
removed and replaced by a full-depth cast in place concrete slab.     
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4.9.1 Bridge Details 
 
 This 4-span bridge located in Manatee County, FL District 1 was built in 1981. Its 
deck was in service for nearly 23 years before replacement. The bridge has two main 
spans of 108 ft 10 in. with two secondary spans of 43 ft.  Its overall length is 303 ft 8 in. 
 
  The shorter spans used two AASHTO Type IV beams on the outside and six 
AASHTO Type II beams on the inside all spaced 8 ft 8 9/16 in. apart. The main span has 
eleven AASHTO Type IV beams spaced about 6 ft 9 in on centers as shown in Fig. 4.38  
 
 The deck has a 7.5 in. thick concrete slab with the precast panel component being 
either 2-½ in. or 3-½ in. (at the rib-section) thick as shown in Fig. 4.2. The specified 
compressive strength of concrete for the precast panel is 5,000 psi. It is 3,000 psi for the 
cast in place concrete slab.  
 
Table 4.8    Bridge #130085 
Bridge #130085 Characteristics 
Year Built 1981 
Number of Spans 4  
Lanes on Structure 4 
ADT  (2001) 25,000 
Percent Truck (ADTT) 10% 
Composite Slab Thickness 7-½ in. 
Precast Panel Thickness 2-½ in (panel) 3-½ in (ribs) 
Girder Type AASHTO Type II and IV 
Deck Condition Rating (2003) 7 (Good condition ) 
 105 
12'12'
6'
2'-10 916" 6'-1
3
16" 6'-1
3
16" 6'-1
3
16" 6'-1
3
16"
Bay 1 Bay 10Bay 9Bay 8Bay 7Bay 6Bay 5Bay 4Bay 3
Type IV Girders
Bay 2
Thru Traffic Lanes
Aux. Lane
2'-10 916"6'-1
3
16"6'-1
3
16"6'-1
3
16"6'-1
3
16"6'-1
3
16"6'-1
3
16"
10'
12' 12'
Figure 4.38    Cross Section View of Bridge #130085 span 2 
 
 This bridge has three main lanes, a 12 ft wide auxiliary lane, and two shoulders – 
one 6 ft wide and the other 10 ft, as shown in Fig. 4.38. 
  
  The forensic study was conducted on spans 2 to 4, bays 1 to 5. This section of the 
bridge and the rest of the bridge, exhibited only longitudinal and some transverse 
cracking typical of deck panel construction. No spalls or previous deck repairs were 
noticed on this bridge (Fig 4.39). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.39    Bridge # 130085 Prior to Deck Removal  
 
 
* Bays covered on the study (1 – 5) 
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4.9.2  Findings 
 
 In this bridge was found that the panels were initially placed over a 1 ½ wide 
fiberboard strip, and a 2 in wide grout layer (Fig. 4.40), providing positive bearing 
support to the panels. But also was found that the fiberboard was later replaced by epoxy, 
as recommended in a previous research study [14] as a way to stop actual or to prevent 
future deterioration on deck panel bridges. 
 
 The panel bearings were inspected in a large area of the deck, and it was found that 
some spots where the precast panel wasn’t long enough to reach the grout, so those 
panels were only supported initially by the fiberboard and now by the epoxy repair (Fig. 
4.40 4.41). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.40    Bridge # 130085 Original Panel Bearing Detail  
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Figure 4.41    Bridge # 130085 Bearing Detail after Epoxy Repair 
 
 
    
 
Figure 4.42    Bridge # 130085 Panel Bearing Details 
 
 
 Despite the use of positive panel bearing in this bridge, typical deterioration such as 
panel face separation, vertical cracking were detected (Fig. 4.43). The same cracking has 
been found in bridges with negative panel bearing. This proves that it is not related to the 
type of bearing used to support the panel.  
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Figure 4.43    Surface Longitudinal Crack Bridge # 130085  
 
 
 As in bridges (100398 and 100417) the relative good condition of this bridge can be 
linked to the fact that the this bridge was built using positive (grout) bearing for the 
precast panels, plus the fact that the fiberboard was later replaced by epoxy, that could 
have helped to prevent deterioration in spots were the panel was supported only by the 
fiberboard (Fig. 4.42(b)). 
 
 
4.10 Study Summary 
 
 The following table (Table 4.9) summarizes all the different types of panel 
bearings found in the bridges covered on the forensic study, and the link between the type 
of bearing and the condition of the deck. 
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Table 4.9    Bearing and Deck Condition Summary 
Bridge 
# 
Study 
Date 
Built Bearing Type  Comments 
130078 
& 
130079 
6/03 1981 
Originally Fiberboard 
Bearing, Now Partial 
Epoxy Bearing 
Replacement. 
Major deficiencies found in spots 
were no epoxy replacement was 
conducted. Maybe because fiberboard 
was too thin to be removed and too 
thin the space for epoxy to be placed. 
170140 1/04 1981 
Originally Fiberboard 
Bearing, Now Full Epoxy 
Bearing Replacement. 
No major deficiencies found. Thick 
fiberboard therefore full epoxy 
bearing replacement. 
130075 5/04 1981 
Originally Fiberboard 
Bearing, Now Partial 
Epoxy Bearing 
Replacement. 
Major deficiencies found in spots 
were no epoxy replacement was 
conducted.  
100415 6/04 1983 
Fiberboard with panel 
overhang, to allow concrete 
under the panel supports. 
Major deficiencies found in spots 
were no concrete went under the 
panel. Or the panel was to short to 
provide the overhang. 
100398 6/04 1984 Fiberboard Plus Grout Bearing. 
Bridge deck in good condition, only 
longitudinal and transverse cracking. 
100417 7/04 1983 Fiberboard Plus Grout Bearing. 
Bridge deck in good condition, only 
longitudinal and transverse cracking. 
130085 8/04 1981 
Originally Fiberboard Plus 
Grout Bearing. Now Full 
Epoxy Bearing 
Replacement plus grout. 
Bridge deck in good condition. In 
some sports the panel was too short to 
reach the grout and was only 
supported by the fiberboard (now 
epoxy). 
 
 Even though it was originally thought that all the deck panel bridges in FDOT 
Districts 1 and 7 were built supported only by fiberboard (negative bearing), it was found 
that 4 out of 7 bridges in the study had some kind of positive panel bearing -grout or 
concrete-. And all the major deterioration is linked to negative bearing created due to 
original design or construction inaccuracy.      
 
 
 Table 4.10 provides a summary of the most significant findings in each bridge 
included in the study. These findings cover all the typical deck top deficiencies in deck 
panel bridges. 
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Table 4.10    Forensic Study Summary 
Bridge # Study 
Date 
New Finding  Verification 
130078 
& 
130079 
6/03 No Deck Surface Cracking. 
Longitudinal Deck Surface Cracking. 
Transverse Deck Surface Cracking. 
Additional Longitudinal Cracking. 
Deck Spalling and Delamination. 
 
170140 1/04 Epoxy Panel Bearing Repair Condition. Longitudinal Deck Surface Cracking. 
No Deck Surface Cracking. 
Additional Longitudinal Cracking. 
130075 5/04 Epoxy Bearing Repair Cond. Cracking 
on M1 Repair 
Longitudinal Deck Surface Cracking.  
100415 6/04 Different types of bearing (Positive 
Negative) 
Longitudinal Deck Surface Cracking. 
Deck Spalling and Delamination. 
100398 6/04 Positive Panel Bearings Longitudinal Deck Surface Cracking. 
100417 7/04  Longitudinal Deck Surface Cracking. 
Positive Panel Bearings 
130085 8/04 Grout + Epoxy Bearing Repair.  Longitudinal Deck Surface Cracking 
 
 
 From the previous studies it was possible to obtain valuable information regarding 
the deterioration of deck panel bridges. This information would have been very difficult 
to obtain only from lab tests.  
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CHAPTER 5.  FAILURE MECHANISM 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 
 From the information obtained from the analysis of failed bridges (Ch. 3) and 
forensic investigations, it is possible to develop a model that identifies the progression in 
deterioration that can potentially lead to localized failure. This is described in the 
following sections.  
 
5.2 Deck Failure Mechanism Model 
 
5.2.1 Stage #1 Initial Condition 
 
 The first stage is the initial condition of the bridge after being built. At this point 
we can identify two main groups of parameters that can affect long term performance of 
the bridge deck, these are: 
 
1. Design Parameters – Relative easy to quantify -  
a. Type of deck design Deck panel, or full depth cast in place concrete deck  
b. Type of panel bearing Positive panel bearing (grout, concrete), Negative 
bearing (fiber board) 
c.  Deck geometry Deck thickness, beam spacing, beam type, span length 
d. Deck material properties Concrete f’c, water cement ratio 
e. Traffic volume Average daily traffic (ADT), Average daily truck traffic 
(ADTT), Actual and estimated future values. 
f. Lane placement Location of the wheel path relative to the edge of the 
girders. 
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2. Construction quality parameters - Very difficult to quantify – 
a.  Deck thickness accuracy – it was found that in some cases the deck 
thickness was 10% smaller than the design value. And this type of deck is 
very sensitive to reductions in the slab thickness. 
b. Top steel rebar cover.  When the top steel rebar is very close to the surface 
of the deck chances of delamination and spalling are greater. 
c. Concrete properties. Actual water cement content ratio, concrete curing 
process, f’c value before the bridge was opened to traffic, capacity of the 
concrete to resist the environment, actual f’c values. 
d. Real panel bearing condition; It was found that poor workmanship can 
significantly affect the real condition of the panel bearing. 
 
5.2.2 Stage #2 Longitudinal/ Transverse Cracking 
 
 The second stage is the occurrence of longitudinal cracks over the edges of the 
girders. This is the most common type of cracking in deck panel bridges and starts early. 
This crack is mainly the result of creep induced by prestressing forces in the panel, and 
the differential shrinkage between the cast in place concrete and the deck panel (Fig. 5.1). 
Following the formation of longitudinal cracking sporadic transverse cracks can also 
develop due only to differential shrinkage. 
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Figure 5.1    Deterioration Stage #2 
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5.2.3 Stage #3. Shear Failure Longitudinal Cracking 
 
  The third stage is the occurrence of additional longitudinal cracking on the deck 
surface, parallel to the cracking described previously. This additional cracking is the 
result of a shear failure of the cast in place concrete. This type of cracking is the first sign 
of future deck deterioration. This type of cracking is related only to panels supported on 
negative bearing. 
 
 When the deck panels are supported only by fiberboard and no strand extension 
has been provided in the panel face, all the shear loads on this region have to be 
supported by the cast in place section in top of the panel edge, instead of being 
transferred by the entire composite section  
 
  The shear failure that causes this crack occurs in part due to the reduction of the 
shear capacity in the -already overstressed- cast place concrete slab. This shear reduction 
is cause by the vertical cracking described in section 5.2.3 It was also found that this 
reduction is affected by the shape of the vertical crack. Fig. 5.2 relates the shape of the 
crack to shear reduction. Reductions are higher when the crack extends towards the girder 
edge, and smaller when the crack extends towards the center of the girder.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2    Effect of Vertical Crack Shape in Shear Reduction 
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Reduction  
Low Reduction 
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 From the forensic examinations, two different types of shear failures were 
identified.  
 
 The first type of failure occurs when the cast in place concrete still has some 
capacity to transmit shear according to the shape of the vertical crack (Fig. 5.2). This 
shear failure is manifested by the appearance of a diagonal cracking emanating from the 
corner of the precast panel and that propagates at an angle of less than 45 degrees. In 
most of the cases this crack reaches the surface generating additional longitudinal cracks 
( Fig. 5.3 (a)). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3    Shear Failures for Different Degrees of Shear Reduction 
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 The second type of shear failure occurs when due to the vertical crack, the cast in 
place concrete has lost all its shear capacity. In this case, the shear is transmitted only by 
the steel rebar by dowel action. When the shear load is too high, the rebar acts like a 
“crowbar” in to concrete on top of the rebar, creating delamination in that area. (See Fig. 
5.3(b)). 
 
 Since this crack is related to shear, it is more likely to occur in the cases where the 
wheel loads are located close to the support of the panels; this is the load location that 
provides the highest shear value in the section of interest. 
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Figure 5.4    Deterioration Stage #3 
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Figure 5.5    Examples of Deterioration Stage #3 
 
5.2.4 Stage #4 First Spall 
 
 After the occurrence of the second parallel crack, the concrete trapped between 
the two cracks is already internally cracked and starts to crumble. As a result, a spall 
develops. At this stage, a new parameter is introduced, the effect of the rainwater forced 
inside the cracks by vehicles. Although this is difficult to quantify, bridge inspectors have 
observed this phenomenon over the years,  
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Figure 5.6    Deterioration Stage #4 
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5.2.5 Stage #5 Spall Increase, Then Spall Patch  
 
  After the occurrence of the first spall in stage#4 it will keep increasing in size 
basically due to the effect of the impact of the wheels at the edges of the existing spall. 
The maximum size of the spall and additional deterioration of the deck depends on how 
long it is left unrepaired. Usually the spalls are patched before they reach a relatively 
large size. For the majority of the cases, the repair consists of a temporary patch using a 
flexible material. 
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Figure 5.7    Deterioration Stage #5 
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5.2.6 Stage #6 New Spalling Plus Spall Increase   
 
 Depending on all the different factors mentioned earlier, new spalls can appear in 
the areas adjacent to the repaired spall after some time.  Note that after the spall is 
created, the residual shear capacity of that region is almost zero, even after it has been 
patched, therefore, the shear that was to be supported by that region now has to be 
redistributed to sections adjacent to the spall. This creates additional stresses in that 
region, and accelerates its deterioration generating new spalls.   
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Figure 5.8    Deterioration Stage #6 
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Figure 5.8    (Continued) 
 
5.2.7 Stage #7 M1 Repair  
 
 Generally after several patch and re-patch processes an M1 repair is done in the 
affected area. An M1 repair consists of the removal of all the patched, spalled, and 
unsound concrete section, and it is replaced by repair material. To do this, the edges of 
the section to be removed are cut and the concrete inside is removed using a jack 
hammer. Usually the intent is to remove cast in place concrete as close as possible to the 
deck panel surface. The opened surface is then cleaned and the removed concrete is 
replaced with different types of high strength epoxy materials. And in some cases the 
fiberboard bearing is replaced by epoxy. 
 
 The durability of the M1 repair and the condition of the deck area around it 
depends of the following parameters: 1. Time period between spall, spall repair, and M1 
repair 2. Possible internal damage to the panel induced from previous stages 3. Possible 
internal damage to the panel induced from removal of cast in place concrete 4. Bonding 
between the old concrete and the repair material 5. Stress redistribution to adjacent areas 
(after removal of the damaged cast in place concrete that deck region is no longer 
transferring shear to the supports, so that shear is redistributed to the transverse edges of 
Patched spalls 
(Asphalt) 
New Spall  
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the repair) (6)Repair Material – (7) are the panel shear connectors  embedded in the M1 
Repair (8) How quickly was the repaired section opened to traffic. And finally the most 
important: (9) was the fiberboard removed and replaced with non shrink epoxy? 
 
Removed Top Cast 
in Place Concrete
Deck Panel 
Top Surface
Saw Cut
Shear Stress 
Concentration region
Due to Stress Redistribution
8
Cast in place concrete 
over girder top Fiberboard 
Bearing
Precast Deck Panel.
Shear Stress 
Concentration region
Due to Stress Redistribution
Removed Top Cast 
in Place Concrete
Panel Setlement due to 
live loads present in the 
deck during repair process 
Removed Top Cast 
in Place Concrete
 
 
Figure 5.9    M1 Repair Procedure (Stage #7) 
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Figure 5.10    Deterioration Stage #7 
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5.2.8 Stage #8 Shear Failure Cracking Adjacent to an M1 Repair  
 
 Assuming that the panel bearing wasn’t replaced by epoxy, or that it was replaced 
but due to construction problems there is no full support of the panel by the epoxy, the 
deck area  adjacent to an M1 repair, starts the deterioration process again with the 
appearance of the additional parallel cracking – shear failure cracking - described in 
(section 5.2.3). The parameters that affect the occurrence of this additional deterioration 
case are the same mentioned for stages #3 and #7. 
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Figure 5.11    Deterioration Stage #8 
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5.2.9 Stage #9 Spalling Adjacent to an M1 Repair 
 
 After the occurrence of additional longitudinal cracking, a new spall develops and 
it follows the same mechanism mentioned in stage #4. 
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Figure 5.12    Deterioration Stage #9 
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5.2.10   Stage #10 Cracking on M1 Repair and Adjacent Spalling Increase  
 
 When the spall mentioned in stage #9 is not patched quickly, is very likely that 
the M1 repair can be fractured due to the constant impact of the wheels over it. Impact 
can also cause growth of adjacent spalls, and delamination between the panel surface and 
the M1 repair.  
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Figure 5.13    Deterioration Stage #10 
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5.2.11   Stage #11 Adjacent Spall Patch  
 
 Right after the spall is noticed and depending on its size, it is patched. Usually a 
quick temporary repair is done in most cases using flexible material. Then what we have 
here is a fractured and delaminated M1 repair, plus a flexible material patch. The 
structural capacity of this deck section is very limited generating redistribution of stresses 
to adjacent areas. Also in the case where no positive bearing has been provided to the 
panel, it will experience settlement every time the deck section is loaded due to the lack 
of stiff support.  
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Figure 5.14    Deterioration Stage #11 
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 In some cases where the fiberboard is deteriorated or is missing, the panel can 
even touch the top of the girder every time it deflects. Due to the dynamic nature of the 
wheel loads, panel movement can generate a pulse between the panel and the top of the 
girder, creating a hammering action and introducing new stresses in the panel.   
 
 The parameters that affect this stage are (1) Time period between spall beginning, 
and spall patch, (2) patch material, (3) lack of bond between repair and panel top, (4) 
degree of disrepair of the precast panel and the M1 repair. 
 
5.2.12 Stage #12  Additional Adjacent Spalling 
 
 After stage #12, since the structural capacity of the section is not restored 
deterioration of the deck surface will continue and can generate new spalls adjacent to the 
previous patch, and next to the edges of the M1 repair. At this point, the deterioration of 
the deck panel is accelerated by the effect of wheel loads applied over small chunks of 
concrete over the panel. This concentrates the wheel load over a very small region of the 
panel surface instead of distributing it over the entire deck section. As a result large 
stresses are generated in the panel which increases the probability of the occurrence of a 
punching shear failure of the panel.  
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Figure 5.15    Deterioration Stage #12 
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5.2.13 Stage #13 Deck Localized Failure  
 
 After experiencing all the previous deterioration stages, a localized failure is 
likely to occur. When this happens, the top steel bar is the only structural element that 
prevents the occurrence of the failure of the entire bay. 
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Figure 5.16    Deterioration Stage #13 
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Figure 5.17    Example of Deterioration Stage #13 
 
5.3 Summary 
 
 The deck deterioration model described in this chapter can be summarized in the 
following failure tree. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.18    Deck Failure Tree
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CHAPTER 6.   SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
6.1 Summary 
 
 The goal of this study was to identify the deterioration process and failure 
mechanism of deck panel bridges in Florida. 
 
 Typical deficiencies on deck panel bridges are described in Chapter 2. This 
information was collected from FDOT’s deck inspection reports available since the 
construction of the bridges to date.   
 
 Between 2000 and 2003, localized failures occurred in five panel bridges in 
Districts 1 and 7. Relevant information relating to these failures was collected and 
analyzed with the intent of identifying underlying trends. 
 
 Forensic investigations were carried out on seven deck panel bridges scheduled 
for replacement during 2003-2004 and located within easy driving of the USF campus. 
The objective was to obtain first hand evidence of deterioration and to gain understanding 
of the degradation process.  
 
 All the information collected was used  to develop a deck failure model, and to 
identify the parameters that affect the structural behavior of the deck. 
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6.2 Localized Failures 
 
6.2.1 Failure Trend 
 
 National Bridge Inventory deck condition rating  was found to be a poor indicator 
for predicting panel deck failures. All bridges that failed were rated between 5 
(satisfactory) to 7 (good). Inspection records give a periodic snapshot on the condition of 
the bridge. Whereas biennial inspection data were generally unable to predict failure, 
monthly inspection records were far more successful in tracking problems that led to 
failure. 
 
 Simplified calculations show that punching failures could result at loads below 
the design wheel load. This assumed the cast-in-place deck to provide no resistance and 
the panel to be supported on fiberboard with well developed cracking along the 
transverse and longitudinal panel boundaries. The failure load was calculated to be 
around 15 kips (Table 3.4). Otherwise, failure loads were nearly four times higher. 
 
 
6.2.2 Environmental Factors 
 
 In four out of the five cases there was rainfall prior to failure. The most severe 
rainfall preceded the last failure (1.1 in.). The exact role of rainwater is not known. 
However, given that the concrete in the deck separates cleanly from the reinforcement, it 
probably adversely affects bond and degrades the cohesiveness of the cement paste. Thus, 
it is reasonable to conclude that rainfall accelerates existing damage that can result in 
failure. 
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6.2.3 Failure Location 
  
 All failures occurred under the wheel loads applied close to the face of the girders 
where initial longitudinal cracks developed.  Also in all five cases, the failure occurred in 
the right lane, i.e. slow lane (Table 3.16). Failure was generally at the edge or corner 
panels whose boundaries developed reflective longitudinal and transverse cracking. 
 
Table 6.1   Failure Summary 
 
Bridge # 
 
Year 
Built 
Age at 
Failure 
(yrs) 
ADT 
(ADTT) 
 
Failure 
Size 
Location in 
Panel Comment 
170146 1981 19  34,000 (30%) 
18 in x 
24 in 
Edge or 
Corner? Failure at M1 repair 
170086 1980 20 34,000 (30%) 
36 in x 
60 in Corner Support Patch  repair 
170085 1980 20 34,000 (30%) 
18 in x 
18 in Corner 
Failure adjacent to M1 
repair 
100332 1980 22 23,000 (8%) 
48 in x 
30 in Near corner Asphalt Patch 
100332 1980 23 23,000 (8%) 
24 in x 
36 in Edge 
Failed M1 repair with 
flexible patch material  
   * National Bridge Inventory condition rating given in the bridge inspection prior to the deck failure 
 
 
6.2.4 Bridge Characteristics  
 
 All failures occurred in bridges where the deck was nominally 7 in. thick. No 
failures occurred in deck panel bridges with thicker slabs. The ADTT varied between 8-
30% (Table 6.1). 
 
 Also it may be noted that the failures occurred in two twin bridges (NB and SB - 
170086, 170085), and in a bridge adjacent to these two (170146). It is very likely that 
these three bridges were built with similar defects by the same contractor. The other two 
cases also occurred in the same bridge (100332 spans 38 and 70). 
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6.3 Forensic Investigation 
 
 The most important conclusion is that the lack of positive panel bearing is clearly 
the main factor responsible for the occurrence of major deck deterioration such as 
delamination, spalling, failing repairs, and in the worst case localized punch-thru deck 
failures. The lack of positive bearing can occur due to two main reasons: 
 
1. When the initial deck design indicates the use of only fiberboard as bearing 
material for the panels (Fig.1.3). 
2. Or in the case where positive bearing is specified in the design, but due to 
construction deficiencies the panel may not be properly supported over stiff 
material. (Fig. 4.25 – 4.26).   
 
 Not all the deck panel bridges in FDOT Districts 1 and 7 were built using 
negative panel bearing (panel supported by fiberboard only) as originally thought. Four 
out of seven bridges covered in the study where built using positive panel bearings. 
 
 The occurrence of deck surface longitudinal and transverse cracking is not related 
to the type of panel bearing, positive or negative. This can be found in both types of 
bearing. This type of cracking has proven to remain stable through the years in bridges 
with positive panel bearing. 
  
Three common factors were found in all the deteriorated decks: 
 
1. Lack of stiff support for the deck panels (negative bearing) 
2. Wheel loads close to the supports (creating maximum shear stresses) 
3. Vertical crack (due to creep and shrinkage) that reduces the shear capacity of 
the cast in place concrete. 
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6.4  Deterioration Model 
 
 Even though a deterioration model and a deck failure mechanism for deck panel 
bridges was successfully developed in this study, it is still difficult to accurately predict 
the future condition of different deck panel bridges using the model because most of the 
factors that influence how fast the deterioration can occur are very difficult to quantify. 
i.e. 
1.   Construction details: Type of panel bearing used (positive – negative), deck        
      thickness  (in most of the bridges real  “as built” plans are not available). 
2.   Deck construction quality: Actual  deck thickness, concrete quality (this can   
      influence the formation of creep and shrinkage cracks), concrete cover for top   
      rebars, panel length (does it have the right length to be supported by the grout)   
 for positive bearing construction.  
3.   How is the shear capacity of the deck affected after the appearance of creep and  
      shrinkage cracks?( see Fig. 5.2). This is very difficult to quantify. 
4.  Specifications and quality of previous deck repairs (epoxy panel bearing    
     replacement, M1 repairs, spall patches.  WHAT DOES THIS MEAN  
 
 
6.5  Recommendations for Bridge Deck Replacement Prioritization 
 
 
  As mentioned in 6.4, to develop an efficient deck replacement prioritization plan 
for deck panel bridges, based on the prediction of the future structural behavior is not 
feasible. 
 
 The recommendation we can give after conducting this study is to conduct a more 
in-depth search in order to quantify the two most important factors that affects the 
condition of the bridge decks. These are the type of panel bearing detail used in each 
bridge (positive – negative bearing) and deck thickness. Even though searches were 
conducted at FDOT District 1 and 7 Bridge Maintenance office, these details were not 
found. These may be available in construction records archive at another FDOT office. 
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 After identifying those parameters, this is the recommended approach for deck 
replacement prioritization: 
 
Table 6.2   Deck Replacement Prioritization Approach 
 
Priority 
Initial Bearing 
detail 
(Fig. 1.3) 
Epoxy bearing 
replacement 
Actual deck 
condition Comments 
High Negative No Heavy 
deterioration * 
Replace the entire 
deck 
 
Negative  Not in the entire 
deck, or too thin 
< ¾ “(Fig. 4.20) 
Heavy 
deterioration * 
Replace the entire 
deck 
 
Negative  Yes and more 
than ¾”  thick 
 (Fig. 4.16 d) 
Deterioration in 
isolated locations 
only 
Replace the entire 
deck 
 
Positive No Deterioration in 
isolated locations 
only (Fig 4.40) 
If feasible,  
replace only 
deteriorated deck 
sections covering 
entire bay 
 
Negative  Yes and more 
than ¾”  thick 
 (Fig. 4.16 d) 
Only typical 
cracking 
Replacement may 
not be required, 
unless new 
deterioration 
appears 
Low 
Positive Yes and more 
than ¾”  thick 
 (Fig. 4.41) 
Only typical 
cracking 
Replacement may 
not be required, 
* Assume also typical longitudinal and transverse cracking. 
 
6.6 Future Work 
 
 In order to fully validate the deterioration model developed in this study, each 
deterioration stage should be analyzed in detail using finite element analysis. The 
objective is to obtain additional information about the model that could not be obtained 
from forensic examination.  
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 The numerical analysis of the model will be conducted by Dr. Niranjan Pai, 
Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of South Florida, as part of an FDOT research 
project. This will lead to the development of a deck replacement prioritization scheme for 
the panel deck bridges remaining in FDOT Districts 1 and 7. 
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APPENDIX A: PUNCHING SHEAR CALCULATIONS 
 
ASSUMPTIONS 
 
1. Failure plane assumed to be linear. 
2. Failure plane unaffected by the presence of higher compressive strength of 
the precast deck. 
3. Prestressed panel assumed to be reinforced concrete for shear calculations. 
 
NOTE: 
 
Tire Contact area:           
inl
inb
10
20
=
=
 
 
Determination of shear strength: As per ACI 11.12.2.1    
    
Shear strength of concrete Vc is smallest of the following 
 
                Vc1 = dbf oc
c
'
42 


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

+ β                                 (Equation 11-33) 
                Vc2 = dbfb
d
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
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+α                               (Equation 11-34) 
                Vc3 = 4 dbf oc'                                             (Equation 11-35) 
Where,         
         bo = punching shear area at distance d/2 from the face of the loaded area  
 
         βc = ratio of long side to short side of the concentrated area    
         βc =  210
20
=

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
        
        αs =  20  (corner) αs =  40  (center)  
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Appendix A, (Continued) 
 
Case 1 Full Composite Action (Corner) 
 
 
Figure A.1   Shear Failure Detail (Corner) 
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Appendix A, (Continued) 
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                                               Shear strength of pre-cast panel  kipV panelc 5.26_ =  
 
             Total composite deck punching shear strength           CIP_cpanel_ccomp VVV +=  
 
        kipVcomp 3.56=  
 
Case 2. No Composite Action (Corner)  
 
 
 
Figure A.2   Shear Failure Detail (No Composite - Corner) 
 
 
 2c =β   psi5000'f pan_c =   Min ind pan 06.2=    20s =α   (corner) 
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                 Shear strength of pre-cast panel    kipV ribc 3.15_ =  
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Case 3 Full Composite Action (Edge) 
 
 
Figure A.3   Shear Failure Detail (Edge) 
 
-Cast in place slab 
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                                                  Shear strength of cast in place slab      kipV CIPc 1.49_ =  
 
-Precast deck panel 
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                                               Shear strength of pre-cast panel  kipV panelc 4.41_ =  
 
             Total composite deck punching shear strength           CIP_cpanel_ccomp VVV +=  
 
        kipVcomp 2.92=  
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Case 4. No Composite Action (Edge)  
 
Figure A.4  Shear Failure Detail (No Composite - Edge) 
 
 2c =β   psi5000'f pan_c =   Min ind pan 06.2=    20s =α   (corner) 
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                 Shear strength of pre-cast panel    kipV ribc 7.21_ =  
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APPENDIX B: CORE EVALUATION I-75 OVER MOCCASIN WALLOW RD 
Location of retrieved deck sections used for coring. 
 
99'-9"
99'-9"
45'-3"
Span 4
Span 3
1
2
3
Span 2
5
4
45'-3"
Span 1
6
 
 
Figure B.1    I-75NB over Moccasin Wallow Bridge   
Deck sections # 2 and # 6 
were rejected for the 
study due to heavy 
damage incurred during 
the removal process 
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Appendix B, (Continued) 
Table B.1   Core Details of Deck Section # 1 
 
Core Details of Deck Section # 1 
Delaminated 
repair joint
Cracking, delamination 
and spalling
Wheel Paths 
M1 spall repair
Girder
1-1
1-31-4
1-2
Girder
 
CORE DESCRIPTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This section intercepts a crack and and an 
M1 repair. It is located about 1 ft from the 
supported edge as shown in the sketch. The 
core was extracted as two pieces with the 
panel completely separated from the cast in 
place slab. The M1 repair was completely 
debonded from the cast-in-place slab. Signs 
of water going thru the interface of the M1 
repair and signs of rebar corrosion were 
also present.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This core was taken from the M1 repair 
section as indicated in the sketch above. 
The core was extracted in two pieces with 
the M1 repair completely Debonded at its 
interface with the cast in place concrete. 
The total thickness was 7 5/8 in with the 
M1 repair being 3 5/8 in, the cast-in-place 
slab 1 in and the prestressed panel 3 in.  
Separation 
Panel 
C.I.P 
1-1 
M1Repair 
1-2 
C.I.P 
Panel 
M1 Repair 
De-bonding 
 154 
Appendix B, (Continued) 
Table B.1   (Continued) 
CORE DESCRIPTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This core was taken between two parallel 
cracks close to the edge of the panel 
support. There was no debonding at the 
interface between the CIP slab and the 
panel. However, there was diagonal 
separation at the top (1/2 in at one end to 2 
in at the other end ). The concrete in this 
section was four small pieces and signs of 
water infiltrating the crumbled concrete 
were present.  
 
Total core thickness 7 5/8 in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The core was adjacent to 1-3 but was closer 
to the support. In this case, there was also 
no separation at the panel/CIP interface and 
a diagonal crack with the same slope (1/2 
in at one end and 2 in. at the other end was 
present). However, the top segment was 
cracked but not in four pieces. Signs of 
water infiltrating the diagonal crack were 
found.  
 
Total core thickness 7 5/8 in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1-4 
Panel 
De-bonded 
Top section 
C.I.P 
Diagonal 
Crack 
1-3 
Panel 
Crumbled 
Concrete 
C.I.P 
Diagonal 
Crack 
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Appendix B, (Continued) 
 
Table B.2   Core Details of Deck Section # 3 
 
Core Details of Deck Section # 3 
Girder
Wheel Paths 
M1 Repair
Girder
3-1
Panel Midspan 
(No deficiencies)
 
CORE DESCRIPTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This core was taken at the middle of the 
panel where there was no deterioration. No 
deterioration was detected in this core. The 
bond between the CIP slab and the precast 
panel was excellent. 
 
Total core height 7 1/2 in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel 
C.I.P 
3-1 
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Table B.3   Core Details of Deck Section # 4 
 
Core Details of Deck Section # 4 
Transverse crack
over transverse 
panel joint
Transverse and 
longitudinal 
cracks intersection
4-2
No Longitudinal 
cracking (Deck top 
over panel edge)Girder
Random 
transverse crack
4-4
4-3
4-1
Wheel Paths 
Girder
 
CORE DESCRIPTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This core was taken at the intersection of a 
longitudinal and transverse crack as shown 
in the sketch above. The longitudinal crack 
extends all the way from the panel through 
the CIP slab. The transverse crack extends 
2 in. below the top slab along the 
transverse panel joint. Despite the cracking, 
the concrete between the cracks is not in 
small pieces amd there are no signs of 
spalling or delamination on the deck 
surface. 
 
Total core height is 8 in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This core was taken over a transverse joint. 
A hairline crack extends all the way from 
the top surface to the transverse panel joint 
 
The bottom part of the core (panel joint), 
was damaged during the extraction process. 
4-1 
Transverse 
Crack 
Transverse 
Joint 
Panel 
Reflective 
Crack 
Longitudinal 
Crack 
4-2 
Transverse 
Crack 
Reflective 
Crack 
Panel 
Transverse 
joint 
Deck  
Surface 
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Table B.3   (Continued) 
CORE DESCRIPTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This core was taken over the edge of the 
panel where there was no surface cracking. 
There is separation between the vertical 
face of the panel and the CIP slab possibly 
due to creep and shrinkage. There is also a 
hairline vertical crack emanating from the 
corner that extends 1 ½ in upwards into the 
CIP slab.  
 
Total core height 8 1/2 in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This core was taken at a section near the 
edge of the panel where there was a 
transverse crack. The crack extended all the 
way from the prestressing strand to the 
steel surface. The surface crack was an 
isolated crack with a length of less than 2 
ft. 
 
Total core height 8 1/2 in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4-4 
Panel 
Vertical 
Crack 
Panel C.I.P 
 Vertical 
Crack 
No Crack 
Face 
Separation 
4-3 
Prestressing 
Strand 
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Table B.4   Core Details of Deck Section # 5 
 
Core Details of Deck Section # 5 
 
5-5
M1 Repair 
Joint
M1 Repair 
Joint
5-6
5-4
5-2
Spall Patch
Girder
Typical longitudinal 
crack
Wheel Paths 
Girder
5-7
5-3
M1 Repair 
Joint
 
CORE DESCRIPTION 
  
This core was rejected due to heavy 
damage incurred during extraction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This core was taken from an epoxy 
repaired region between near two parallel 
cracks where it intercepted one of them. 
There was excellent bonding between the 
epoxy material and the CIP slab. The 
core was broken 2 in from the top during 
the extraction process. 
 
This core has the mark of a shear 
connector embedded between the panel 
and the cast in place concrete. 
 
Total core height 8 in 
 
5-2 Epoxy 
Patch 
C.I.P 
Panel 
Shear connector 
mark  
5-1 
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Table B.4   (Continued) 
CORE DESCRIPTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This core was taken from the edge of an 
M1 repair. There was good bond between 
the M1 repair and existing concrete.  
 
This core was also broken in half during 
the extraction process.  
 
Total core height 7 ¾ in. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This core was taken at a transverse joint 
for an M1 repair. There was no bond 
between the M1 repair and the existing 
concrete. The concrete adjacent to the 
vertical repair joint was crumbled, and 
had signs of water infiltration. 
 
The panel vertical face easily separated 
from the adjacent cast in place concrete. 
 
Not all the pieces of the core could be 
retrieved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This core was taken adjacent to 5-4 but 
some distance away from the edge. It 
shows de-bonding between the M1 repair 
and the adjacent cast in place concrete. 
 
This core broke at the vertical edge of the 
M1 repair during the extraction process. 
 
Total core height 8 in. 
 
Good bond 
Panel 
C.I.P 
5-3 
M1Repair 
5-5 
M1Repair 
Panel 
De-bonding 
5-4 
M1Repair 
Crumbled 
Concrete 
Panel Vertical 
Face 
C.I.P 
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Table B.4   (Continued) 
CORE DESCRIPTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This core was taken adjacent to 5-2 near 
the edge of the panel where it crossed a 
longitudinal crack. It shows a vertical 
reflective crack extending over the entire 
depth of the core separating the precast 
panel from the CIP slab. There are signs 
of water and dust infiltration.. 
 
The top surface includes a partial epoxy 
patch which is bonded to the CIP slab. 
The penetration of the epoxy penetrating 
below has prevented the top surface from 
crumbling.  
 
Total core height 8 in. 
  
This core was taken along a longitudinal 
crack located at the opposite supported 
edge of the panel from the previous 
cores. The same vertical crack detected in 
core 5-6 occurred but there was no 
additional damage.  
 
There were signs of water penetration in 
the CIP slab. 
 
Total core height 8 1/4 in. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C.I.P 
5-6 
Panel 
Vertical  
Crack 
Epoxy 
Patch 
Crumbled 
Concrete 
Separation 
At Panel Face 
5-7 
Panel C.I.P 
Vertical 
Crack 
Longitudinal 
Crack 
C.I.P 
Diagonal 
Crack 
